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INTRODUCTION

The 2015 Paris Agreement achieved a broad international
consensus on a methodology to limit emissions to control climate
change.2 By its terms, the Paris Agreement anticipates individual
action by individual nation-states.3 But underlying this principle
stands the fact that climate change need not and should not be
addressed only by nation-states. Rather, combatting climate change
requires attention at multiple levels – national, state, regional, and
local – as well as requiring a public-private partnership to engage
businesses in a dedicated effort to achieve meaningful results in
abatement. This article examines overlapping competencies within
the European Union (“EU”) and considers how various actors within
the United States federalist system are engaged in trying to combat
climate change. The question regarding overlapping competencies
extends beyond the legal delineation of authority. At its core is the
question of how to best utilize specific qualities of various
constituencies with overlapping competencies to not only harmonize
efforts but also to achieve maximum utilization of the efforts of
different parties.4 Climate change is a global problem with globally
felt externalities, and it must be addressed globally. It is not one
that will self-resolve. Despite extensive technological advances, we
cannot artificially create a livable habitat. 5 People are dependent
2. Yamide Dagnet et al., Staying on Track From Paris: Advancing the Key
Elements of the Paris Agreement, WORLD RES. INST. 3 (May 2016), www.wri.org/
sites/default/files/Staying_on_Track_from_Paris_-_Advancing_the_Key_
Elements_of_the_Paris_Agreement_0.pdf. Though of course the United States
commitment to the Paris Agreement has changed since the time of its
enactment. See President Donald J. Trump, Statement on the Paris Climate
Accord (June 1, 2017), perma.cc/6GZ7-GJXP (announcing the withdrawal of the
U.S. from the Paris Agreement); see also Chris Mooney, Trump Can’t Actually
Exit the Paris Deal Until the Day After the 2020 Election. That’s a Big Deal.,
WASH. POST, (Dec. 12, 2018), www.washingtonpost.com/energy-environment/
2018/12/12/heres-what-election-means-us-withdrawal-paris-climate-deal/
(explaining the timeline by which the United States can withdraw from the
Paris Agreement).
3. Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change art. 4, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 [hereinafter Paris
Agreement].
4. The issue is not just whether multiple levels of regulation are possible in
combatting climate change. The issue also includes a determination of at which
level of regulation climate change policy can most effectively be implemented.
See Jared Snyder & Jonathan Binder, The Changing Climate of Cooperative
Federalism: The Dynamic Role of the States in a National Strategy to Combat
Climate Change, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 231, 233 (2009) (contending
that the multi-level government response to climate change must be as effective
a use of resources as possible); William W. Buzbee, Federalism Hedging,
Entrenchment, and the Climate Challenge, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 1037, 1039-40
(2017) (arguing that appropriate allocation of state and federal roles can reduce
risk).
5. The major environment problems include: (1) Major changes to the earth’s
atmosphere and climate; (2) Destruction of the ozone; (3) Degradation of topsoil;
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upon the continuing functioning of natural systems and habitats for
survival. A coordinated approach to regulation among layers of
government is essential to a properly functioning, fully utilized
approach to climate change.
This article thus addresses issues of European subsidiarity and
American federalism in the context of climate change. Part II
provides an overview of the basic issues at stake and briefly
sketches the effectiveness of international treaties designed to
address climate change and other approaches to date. No prior
international effort created the cause for optimism that attended
the signing of the Paris Agreement.6 Part III of this article takes a
detailed look at issues of subsidiarity and places the discussion in
the context of climate change. Part IV examines the issue within the
United States, as the federal government’s approaches to climate
change have been dramatically revised over the past couple of years.

II. CLIMATE CHANGE – A PRIMER
A. The Problem
Climate change is the ultimate problem of the commons: when
individuals and corporations are allowed free access to an
exhaustible resource, the natural tendency is one of overuse. 7 The
user realizes the benefits, but a significant portion of the cost is felt
elsewhere.8 As a result, when applied to climate change, the full
effects of carbon emissions are not appropriately reflected in their
price.9 In addition, if individual A does not use the resource,
individual B will. Thus, a socially destructive race to consume the
resource before others do is the inevitable result.
Multiple approaches to address the problem of carbon
emissions have been put forth. One possibility are so called
“command and control” regulations, where government dictates
either limit the absolute allowed amount of an activity or mandate

(4) Loss of biological diversity; and (5) Widespread air and water pollution.
6. Justin Worland, Feeling of Optimism at Paris Climate Talks Despite
Disagreement, TIME (Dec. 9, 2015), time.com/4143334/paris-climate-talksoptimism-cop/. The 2018 United Nations Climate Change Conference, known as
COP24 and held in Katowice, Poland, served largely to implement a game plan
for achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement; see generally, COP24 KATOWICE
2018, cop24.gov.pl/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2019) (providing a “game plan” for
implementing the Paris Agreement).
7. Maebh O’Gorman, Global Warming: A Tragedy of the Commons, COMP.
RES. IN L. & POL. ECON., Research Report No. 32/2010 (2010), digital
commons.osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe/99/.
8. Id.
9. Gabriel Weil, Incentive Compatible Climate Change Mitigation: Moving
Beyond the Pledge and Review Model, 42 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.
923, 929-30 (2018).
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certain required standards.10 A second core approach encompasses
various “cap and trade” structures, which are designed to allow
individuals and the marketplace to shape the allocation of scarce
resources once the government has set an overall emission limit. 11
Other options include tax penalties for those who excessively emit,
and tax credits for those who employ methodologies designed to
limit emissions, such as tax credits for those employing clean
energy. The problem with the latter two approaches, however, is
that they put no upper limit on the overall level of emissions. 12
The impact of the current level of global emissions is not fully
quantifiable, with the worst-case scenarios leading to truly
catastrophic consequences.13 There do, however, seem to be a few
certainties. First, rising emissions will lead to an overall negative
impact on global welfare.14 Second, the losses will continue to grow
as temperatures continue to rise. 15 Third, different nations will
benefit from global emission reduction to different degrees, 16 and
the degree to which countries are affected will not fully correlate
either with the wealth of the country or the degree to which the
country has or has not been an offender when it comes to emissions
standards.17 Rather, many of the most vulnerable locations which
stand to lose the most by rising temperatures are among the poorest
nations on the planet, including many regions of Africa and Asia. 18
10. Gary M. Lucas, Jr., Behavioral Public Choice and the Carbon Tax, 2017
UTAH L. REV. 115, 127 (2017) (requiring that cars be gas-efficient, for example).
11. Id. at 125. In cap and trade, the government sets an overall limit by
issuing pollution permits which can then be bought and sold on the market. Id.
12. Perhaps it is worth noting that traditional cost benefit analysis
measuring the costs of abatement versus the benefits of doing so are extremely
problematic given the difficulty in determining costs in light not only of the
difficulties of measuring long-term impact, but also of quantifying the results of
a catastrophic worst-case scenario. Daniel A. Farber, Coping with Uncertainty:
Cost-Benefit Analysis, The Precautionary Principle, and Climate Change, 90
WASH. L. REV. 1659, 1672 (2015).
13. Simon Beard, Should We Care About The Worst-Case Scenario When It
Comes To Climate Change?, HUFFINGTON POST (Sep. 28, 2017),
www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/simon-beard/climate-change_b_18110618.html.
14. Arden Rowell & Lesley Wexler, Valuing Foreign Loves, 48 GA. L. REV.
499, 501 (2014).
15. Lance N. Long & Ted Hamilton, The Climate Necessity Defense: Proof
and Judicial Error in Climate Protest Cases, 38 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 58, 96 (2018).
16. Gabriel Weil, Incentive Compatible Climate Change Mitigation: Moving
Beyond the Pledge and Review Model, 42 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.
923, 929 (2018).
17. Maxine Burkett, Behind the Veil: Climate Migration, Regime Shift, and
a New Theory of Justice, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 445, 448-49 (2018). The
biggest emitters currently include China, the United States, Indonesia, Brazil,
Russia, Japan, Brazil, and India. Johannes Friedrich et al., This Interactive
Chart Explains World’s Top 10 Emitters, and How They’ve Changed, WORLD
RES. INST. (Nov. 21, 2017), www.wri.org/blog/2017/04/interactive-chartexplains-worlds-top-10-emitters-and-how-theyve-changed.
18. Deepa Badrinarayana, A Constitutional Right to International Legal
Representation: The Case of Climate Change, 93 TUL. L. REV. 48, 90-91 (2018);
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This disparate impact stems not just from geography but also from
such factors as a country’s dependence on agriculture and the extent
to which the nation can afford to divert resources toward efforts of
abatement.19
Climate change is a problem requiring intervention by both
nation-states and private actors. As a result, private, social, and
market-driven incentives also potentially play a significant part in
any successful methodology employed to address climate change.
The activities of multinational corporations impact far more than
their immediate economic concerns. Rather, a multinational’s
enterprises may have broadly felt ramifications in the political,
cultural, social, and environmental realms. Compliance by
multinationals is critical to any successful sustainable development
program.20 Currently, only six nation-states have revenues larger
than the revenues of the largest transnational corporations. 21 As
corporations continue to grow in power and to affect not just
economic development but also the quality of life world-wide, their
impact on the planet will increasingly outweigh that of many
national governments.

B. International Approaches to Date
The international community’s approach to climate change has
largely centered on the creation of a series of international
agreements which collectively thus far have had little success in
achieving abatement.22 The impetus for the need to address climate
change began in earnest upon the wide-spread acceptance of the
Sharmila L. Murthy, States and Cities as “Norm Sustainers”: A Role for
Subational Actors in the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, 37 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 1, 44 (2019). As a result, the poor in the future are by far the greatest likely
to suffer the most from a lack of abatement efforts. Id.
19. See Carmen G. Gonzalez & Sumudu Atapattu, International
Environmental Law, Environmental Justice, and the Global South, 26
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 229, 230-31 (2017) (arguing that the NorthSouth divide is a significant factor in the inability to stop environmental
degradation).
20. Behnam Taebi & Azar Safari, On Effectiveness and Legitimacy of
‘Shaming’ as a Strategy for Combatting Climate Change, 23 HARV. SCI. & ENG’G.
ETHICS 1289 (Apr. 11, 2007).
21. NEIL BOTTEN, CIMA OFFICIAL LEARNING SYSTEM: ENTERPRISE
STRATEGY 62 (2009). “Of the worlds [sic] 100 largest economic actors, 29 were
transnational companies and only 6 nation states had revenues larger than the
top 9 transnationals.” Id. See also Fernando Belinchón & Ruqayyah Moynihan,
25 Giant Companies That are Bigger Than Entire Countries, BUS. INSIDER
ESPAÑA (July 25, 2018), www.businessinsider.com/25-giant-companies-thatearn-more-than-entire-countries-2018-7 (noting power of world’s largest
corporations).
22. David G. Victor, Why Paris Worked: A Different Approach to Climate
Diplomacy, YALE ENV’T 360 (Dec. 15, 2015), e360.yale.edu/features/why_
paris_worked_a_different_approach_to_climate_diplomacy (noting the lack of
success of pre-Paris Agreement attempts to combat climate change).
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link between economic development and climate change. 23
Alongside this recognition came the acceptance of a competing value
– namely, the desire to respect the sovereignty of nations over their
natural resources.24 A conflict of course exists. The desire to
recognize sovereign control is also an implicit recognition of the
international community’s limitation in regulating environment
transforming activity.25
In the late 1980s, as concern about the environment and
climate change began to receive ever-growing attention, the
international community first convened the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”).26 The IPCC was created under
the United Nations Environment Program and that of the World
Meteorological Organization; it was charged with engaging in the
scientific study of climate change.27 The IPCC is currently in its
sixth assessment cycle; to date it has produced five reports, each
broken into sections stemming from the work of the IPCC’s three
primary working groups: (1) the physical science basis of climate
change; (2) impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability; and (3)
mitigation of climate change.28 The first and second IPCC reports
provided much of the scientific basis for two watershed moments in
international climate change conventions – the 1992 Framework
Convention on Climate Change and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.29
The Framework Convention arose from the 1992 UN
Conference on Environment and Development, known as the Earth
Summit, which took place in Rio de Janeiro.30 The level of
participation at Rio was unusually widespread, with all UN
member states plus more than 50 intergovernmental organizations
in attendance.31 The Conference produced two new multilateral
treatises.
The major one was the UN Framework Convention on Climate

23. Channing Arndt et al., Economic Development under Climate Change,
16 REV. OF DEV. ECON. 463 (2012) (examining relationship between climate
change, growth, and investment in infrastructure).
24. David Takacs, Forest Carbon (REDD+), Repairing International Trust,
and Reciprocal Contractual Sovereignty, 37 VT. L. REV. 653, 656-57 (2013).
25. Id.
26. David A. Wirth, The International and Domestic Law of Climate Change:
A Binding International Agreement Without the Senate or Congress?, 39 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 515, 518 (2015).
27. Id.
28. Report, THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC),
www.ipcc.ch/report/sixth-assessment-report-cycle/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2019).
29. See Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 451, 464–70 (1993)
(explaining the role of IPCC in addressing the magnitude and impact of climate
change).
30. Takacs, supra note 24, at 519.
31. Nico Schrijver, The Evolution of Sustainable Development in
International Law: Inception, Meaning and Status, in 2 POCKET BOOKS HAGUE
ACAD. OF INT’L L. 64, 68 (2008).
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Change; the other was the Convention on Biological Diversity, with
the latter reaffirming that states are responsible for conserving
their biological diversity and for using their biological resources in
a sustainable manner.32 It also produced the non-binding Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, which is comprised
of 27 principles on the environment and development – the Rio
Declaration.33
The 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change is among the most important historical attempts at
integrating sustainable development and global environmental
concerns.34 It reflected a significant effort to achieve a balance
between global, regional, and local concerns, as well as a recognition
of the issues that had historically arisen in the North - South
debate.35 Its stated objective was to stabilize greenhouse gases
(“GHGs”) “at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system,” and that such stabilization
“should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow
ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food
production is not threatened and to enable economic development
to proceed in a sustainable manner.”36 It represented the most
politically important collaboration prior to Paris, bringing together
social, economic, and environmental factors within one framework.
There are 165 signatories to the Framework Convention, including
the United States.37
The Framework Convention incorporated a number of
components, including procedural requirements for data exchange
and reporting, a provision for adoption of ancillary protocols, rules
for adoption and amendment of both the Convention itself and any
protocols, a provision for periodic conferences of the parties to the
Convention, and requirements for periodic review of scientific
developments.38 In addition, it contained discussion of such topics
32. United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 818 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993).
33. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1
(Vol. I), annex I (Aug. 12, 1992), www.unesco.org/education/pdf/RIO_E.PDF
[hereinafter Rio Declaration]. Perhaps the most significant part of its 27
Principles is set forth in Principle 4, which affirms that in order to achieve
sustainable development, environmental protection must constitute an integral
part of the development process. Id. at princ. 4.
34. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9,
1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter Framework
Convention].
35. Id.
36. Id. at art. 2.
37. Status of Treaties: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (Mar. 16, 2019), treaties.un.org/
Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7&chapter=27&Temp
=mtdsg3&clang=_en.
38. Framework Convention, supra note 34.
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as intergenerational equity, common but differentiated
responsibilities, and sustainable development.39 Also, the
Convention set forth the goal of stabilizing GHG concentrations “at
a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference
with the climate system.”40
While broadly applicable within the Framework Convention,
the doctrine of common but differentiated responsibilities
specifically delineated two primary groups of signatories. The first
group of nations41 was charged with the obligation to “communicate
. . . detailed information on their policies and measures . . . with the
aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels . . .
anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse
gases . . . .”42 In addition, excluding those states transitioning to a
market economy, the countries so identified in Annex 1 were
obligated provide to financial resources to developing country
parties for mitigation, adaptation, and technology transfer. 43 The
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities charged
developed countries with a responsibility for a larger share of
emissions reductions, both because of their greater wealth 44 and
because developed countries had caused the largest share of
environmental the harm to date.45
But the Framework Convention lacked elements needed for
meaningful implementation. It contained no binding limits on
emissions.46 Rather, its language was largely aspirational.
However, one clear benefit stemming from the Framework
Convention is that it required developed countries to produce
annual inventories of their emissions. 47
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol specified the obligations of
industrialized countries to reduce their emissions of greenhouse

39. Id. at art. 3.
40. Id. at art. 2.
41. Australia, Austria, Belarus†, Belgium, Bulgaria†, Canada, Croatia*†,
Cyprus*, Czech Republic*†, Denmark, European Economic Community,
Estonia†, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary†, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Latvia†, Liechtenstein*, Lithuania†, Luxembourg, Malta*, Monaco*,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland†, Portugal, Romania†, Russian
Federation†, Slovakia*†, Slovenia*†, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
Ukraine†, United Kingdom, and United States of America (Countries added by
amendment after the instrument’s initial adoption are indicated by *. Countries
that were in the process of undergoing a transition to a market economy and
identified as such in Annex I are indicated by †). Id. at annex I.
42. Id. at art. 4(2).
43. Id. at art. 4(3).
44. Framework Convention, supra note 34.
45. Shyam Saran, Paris Climate Talks: Developed Countries Must Do More
Than Reduce Emissions, GUARDIAN (Nov. 23, 2015), www.theguardian.com/
environment/2015/nov/23/paris-climate-talks-developed-countries-must-domore-than-reduce-emissions.
46. Framework Convention, supra note 34, at art. 4.
47. Id. at art. 4(1)(a), 12.
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gases and formulated these obligations in strict legal terms. 48 It
received 84 signatures during the initial period it was open for
signature, but not by the United States – the only major country
which declined to ratify it.49 The Kyoto Protocol stated that between
2008 and 2012, the emission of 6 types of greenhouse gases should
be 5% lower than in 1990.50 Its provisions included directives to
parties to promote sustainable changes by implementing policies
such as energy efficiency in their respective national economies, 51
reducing emissions of greenhouse gases,52 promoting sustainable
farming practices,53 and researching and promoting new forms of
energy.54 But the Kyoto Protocol did not impose emissions limits on
developing countries, nor did it impose significant burdens on most
other countries, including China, the world’s largest emitter. 55
While there had been numerous other world summits and
conventions prior to Paris, none of them effectuated real change in
the regulation of emissions and the control of climate change. 56
Any successful approach will have to include all emitting
nations, including developing nations. In Paris, the result came
close to achieving that goal.

C. The Paris Agreement (and Beyond)
At its signing, the Paris Agreement was hailed as historic. 57
Binding and global, it applies to developed and developing countries
alike.58 It provides for a new paradigm for climate change
regulation, envisioning increased action on climate change
throughout the world. Its scope is broad, addressing mitigation,
adaptation, and ‘loss and damage’ – the latter aimed at addressing
harms caused by climate change – and it establishes processes for

48. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998).
49. The Kyoto Protocol – Status of Ratification, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE
CHANGE,
unfccc.int/process/the-kyoto-protocol/status-of-ratification
(last
visited April 6, 2019).
50. Id. at art. 3(1).
51. Id. at art. 2(1)(a)(i).
52. Id. at art. 2(1)(a)(vi)-(viii).
53. Id. at art. 2(1)(a)(iii).
54. Id. at art. 2(1)(a)(iv).
55. Henry Bewicke, Chart of the Day: These Countries Have the Largest
Carbon Footprints, WORLD ECON. FORUM (Jan. 2, 2019), www.weforum.org/
agenda/2019/01/chart-of-the-day-these-countries-have-the-largest-carbonfootprints/.
56.Victor, supra note 22.
57. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Historic
Paris Agreement on Climate Change: 195 Nations Set Path to Keep Temperature
Rise Well Below 2 Degrees Celsius, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE (Dec. 13,
2015), unfccc.int/news/finale-cop21 [hereinafter UNFCCC Historic Paris
Agreement].
58. Id.
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financing and for technology transfer.59 The Paris Agreement
entered into force on November 4, 2016, 30 days after the date in
which at least 55 parties to the Convention, accounting for a total
of 55% of the greenhouse gas emissions, had ratified it. 60 It allows
for withdrawal after three years from the date the Agreement
became effective.61 As of this writing, 185 Parties have ratified the
Paris Agreement.62
While recognizing differentiation by, among other things,
taking into consideration the difference in circumstances each
country faces in terms of capacity and operational ability to combat
climate change,63 the Paris Agreement adopts an approach which
specifies the same core obligations for all signatories. 64 The Paris
Agreement sets a goal of holding warming well below 2 degrees,
with efforts to limit warming to 1.5 degrees.65 It aims for greenhouse
gas emissions to peak as soon as possible, and to achieve net zero
emissions by the second half of the 21st century.66 It contains a
requirement for mitigation measures of individual countries to be
expressed in nationally determined contributions (“NDCs”), and it
requires that this process of NDCs be revised at least every five
years.67 There is also a mechanism for countries to achieve NDCs
59. Id.
60. Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change art. 21(1), Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 [hereinafter Paris
Agreement].
61. Id. at art. 28(1).
62. Paris Agreement – Status of Ratification, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE
CHANGE, unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-of-ratification (last
visited Mar. 18, 2019); Status of Treaties: Paris Agreement, UNITED NATIONS
TREATY COLLECTION, treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&
mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&clang=_en (last visited Mar. 18, 2019).
63. Id. at preamble. The Preamble states in part:
Also recognizing the specific needs and special circumstances of
developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, as provided for in the
Convention, Taking full account of the specific needs and special
situations of the least developed countries with regard to funding and
transfer of technology, Recognizing that Parties may be affected not only
by climate change, but also by the impacts of the measures taken in
response to it.
Id.
64. See Paris Agreement, supra note 60, at art. 2(2) (stating “[t]his
Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of
different national circumstances”).
65. Id. at art. 2(1)(a) (“[h]olding the increase in the global average
temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts
to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels,
recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate
change”).
66. Id. at art. 4(1).
67. Id. at art. 4(2), (9).
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jointly by working together on shared emissions targets.68 The Paris
Agreement establishes a mechanism for both private and public
entities to support sustainable development projects. 69 Also
included is a commitment to a collective goal of providing USD 100
billion per year to 2025, and beyond 2025 with USD 100 billion as a
floor.70 The Agreement recognizes the need for flexibility and
transparency, and it takes into account the fact that signatories
have different capabilities and issues in addressing climate change.
It also contains a compliance mechanism that is designed to be
facilitative rather than punitive in nature. 71
Amongst its myriad provisions, it is worth highlighting a
handful which provide for a marked delineation from past
approaches. First, it is legally binding. 72 Next, unlike Kyoto, it is
global, applying to developed and developing countries alike. 73 In
addition, it abandons the approach to differentiation of the
Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol in favor of an
approach which specifies the same core obligations for all
signatories while still taking into consideration the difference in
circumstances each country faces in terms of its capacity and
operational ability to combat climate change. Next, its focus is longterm, and it creates a structure for ongoing compliance, requiring
parties every five years to reassess their progress to date and to
make emission reduction plans for the next five-year period
accordingly.74 Included within this is the expectation that the
actions of each signatory country will grow progressively more
aggressive over time.75 Also, the level of transparency it requires is
not only novel but very significant: if a country fails to carry out its
NDC it will be common knowledge to all. 76 And finally, the extent of
Agreement is unprecedented.
Noteworthy, however, is what the Paris Agreement does not
do. It contains no firm imposition of any emission reduction

68. Paris Agreement, supra note 60, at art. 4(16)-(18), 5(2).
69. Id. at art. 6(4).
70. Id. at art. 9; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Climate Finance, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE, unfccc.int/topics/climatefinance/the-big-picture/climate-finance-in-the-negotiations (last visited Apr. 18,
2019).
71. Paris Agreement, supra note 60, at art. 15(2).
72. UNFCCC Historic Paris Agreement, supra note 57. Though admittedly
there are numerous non-binding elements contained within.
73. Id. As of this writing, 184 countries have put forth nationally determined
contributions. Paris Climate Agreement Q&A, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY
SOL., www.c2es.org/content/paris-climate-agreement-qa/ (last visited Apr, 18,
2019); United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, NDC
Registry (interim), UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE, www4.unfccc.int/
sites/NDCStaging/pages/All.aspx (last visited Apr. 29, 2019).
74. Paris Agreement, supra note 60, at art. 4.
75. Id.
76. Id. at art. 4(5), (12).

268

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[52:257

obligations.77 It includes no clear, quantifiable financial
commitment on the part of developed countries to assist developing
countries with achieving mitigation and adaptation.78 Nor does it
impose specific climate change policy or binding reduction targets. 79
Until Paris, most of what had emerged from the international
community relating to climate change were non-comprehensive and
neither sufficiently binding nor sufficiently substantive. Any
successful approach will have to include all emitting nations,
including developing nations. While the Paris Agreement comes
close to achieving that goal, the results remain to be seen. According
to the Climate Action tracker, no major industrial nation is
currently on track to meet its obligations under the Paris
Agreement.80
Post-Paris, the most recent meeting of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change was COP24 in
December of 2018, which gave rise to the “Katowice Climate
Package” (“the Package”).81 The Package was designed to
implement the provisions of the Paris Agreement by, in essence,
creating a “rulebook” which would provide uniform standards to
measure and track the progress made by each country toward
meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement.82
Despite President Trump’s decision to withdraw the United
States from the Paris Agreement, the United States participated in
COP24.83 The United States pushed for a uniform methodology to
measure emissions, one of the major accomplishments from the
COP24 meeting.84 All parties are to use the same standards to
measure and track emissions, with uniformity presumably helping
with transparency,85 the result being increased motivation of
developing and developed countries alike to reach their climate

77. Id. at art. 4, 7, 9-11, 13.
78. Id. at art. 9(1).
79. Id. at art. 4(4).
80. See CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER, climateactiontracker.org/ (last visited
Mar. 18, 2019) (tracking where countries are in relation to NDC’s of the Paris
Agreement).
81. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New Era of
Global Climate Action to Begin Under Paris Climate Change Agreement,
UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE (Dec. 15, 2018), unfccc.int/news/new-era-ofglobal-climate-action-to-begin-under-paris-climate-change-agreement-0.
82. Waskow et al., COP24 Climate Package Brings Paris Agreement to Life,
WORLD RES. INST. (Dec. 21, 2018), www.wri.org/blog/2018/12/cop24-climatechange-package-brings-paris-agreement-life.
83. Office of the Spokesperson, Outcome of the 24th Session of the Conference
of the Parties (COP24) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), U.S. DEP’T OF ST. (Dec. 15, 2018), www.state.gov/
r/pa/prs/ps/2018/12/288121.htm.
84. Brad Plumer, Climate Negotiations Reach an Overtime Deal to Keep
Paris Pact Alive, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/12/15/
climate/cop24-katowice-climate-summit.html.
85. Id.
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change targets.86 Concerns continue to include that there is an
inadequate framework to clarify how wealthier countries will
financially aid developing countries that need financial assistance
to meet their targets.87 There is also concern over whether the
current commitments will be enough to meet the Paris Agreement
target.88 Accounting for carbon credits and their impact on parties’
targets was also delayed.89
Despite these concerns, the hope following COP24 is that the
“rulebook” will provide the necessary framework to implement the
Paris Agreement.90

D. Introduction to the EU and Climate Change
Multilevel governance issues in the area of climate change are
critical following the Paris Agreement. While the international
community has improved its regulatory approach to climate change,
the actual implementation of those policies has been increasingly
moving to local levels of government.91 This process aligns well with
the European Union system of subsidiarity, which stipulates that
policymaking should occur at the lowest effective level.92 The
86. Id.
87. Waskow et al., supra note 82.
88. Brad Plumer & Nadja Popovich, The World Still Isn’t Meeting Its Climate
Goals, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2018), www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/07/
climate/world-emissions-paris-goals-not-on-track.html. See also COP24
Agreement: Does it Go Far Enough?, EURONEWS (Dec. 17, 2018), www.euro
news.com/2018/12/17/cop24-agreement-does-it-go-far-enough (describing that
many believe that the COP24 approach will be insufficient to achieve goals of
Paris Agreement).
89. Fiona Harvey, What was Agreed at COP24 in Poland and Why Did it
Take so Long?, GUARDIAN (Dec. 16, 2018), www.theguardian.com/environment/
2018/dec/16/what-was-agreed-at-cop24-in-poland-and-why-did-it-take-so-long;
See also Brad Plumer, Climate Negotiators Reach an Overtime Deal to Keep
Paris Pact Alive, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/12/15/
climate/cop24-katowice-climate-summit.html (noting that revisions to the
carbon trading market rules would be postponed).
90. Katowice: COP24 Climate Change Deal to Bring Pact to Life, CARBON
BRIEF (Dec. 17, 2018), www.carbonbrief.org/daily-brief/katowice-cop24-climatechange-deal-to-bring-pact-to-life.
91. Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti, Learning from the Leader: The
European Union’s Renewable Energy Mandates as a Blueprint for American
Environmental Federalism, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 173, 200-02 (2012); see Allison
C.C. Hoppe, State-Level Regulation as the Ideal Foundation for Action on
Climate Change: A Localized Beginning to the Solution of a Global Problem, 101
CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1631 (2016) (noting action by state level government on
climate change); Amy Hsu & Amy Weinferter, All Climate Politics is Local: After
Trump’s Paris Withdrawal, Subnational Groups Have Stepped Up , FOREIGN
AFFAIRS (Sept. 24, 2018), www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/201809-24/all-climate-politics-local (describing movement of climate action to local
government and the private sector).
92. ALAIN-G GAGNON, SOEREN KEIL & SEAN MUELLER, UNDERSTANDING
FEDERALISM AND FEDERATION (2015); MICHAEL BURGESS, FEDERALISM AND
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principle of subsidiarity is not focused on allocation of power, but
rather on the regulation of the use of powers between the EU and
its Member States.93 Article Five of the Treaty on the European
Union (“TEU”) states that “[t]he limits of Union competences are
governed by the principle of conferral.”94
The use of Union competences is governed by the principles of
subsidiarity and proportionality and Article 4 adds that
“competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain
with the Member States.”95 The Treaty and the EU Court of Justice
(“ECJ”) case-law collectively suggest that few areas that do not fall
within the competences of the Union, either directly or indirectly.
However, the third paragraph of Article 5 makes clear that the
subsidiarity principle governs all non-exclusive competences.96
Each policy not exclusively given to the EU has to clear a two-fold
test in order to verify the best decision-making level of government
allocation.97 First, the EU bodies must demonstrate that the
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by
the Member States “either at central level or at regional and local
level.”98 Second, it must be demonstrated that the proposed action
“by reason of the scale or effects, can be better achieved at Union
level.”99 What constitutes “sufficiently achieved” is not clearly
articulated, and it may relate not just to effectiveness, but also to
the degree a process is democratic or consistent with other EU
policy. Since environmental policy is not a competence exclusively
given to the EU, the principle of subsidiarity applies to that specific
matter.100
EUROPEAN UNION, THE BUILDING OF EUROPE, 1950-2000, at 231 (2000);
ROBERT SCHÜTZE, FROM DUAL TO COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM: THE CHANGING
STRUCTURE OF EUROPEAN LAW 244 (2009); RONALD L. WATTS, COMPARING
FEDERALISM SYSTEMS 6, 92 (3rd ed. 2008).
93. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on the European Union and the
Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 3(b), Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J.
(C 306) [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon].
94. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union art. 5, Oct.
15, 2012, (C 326) [hereinafter TEU].
95. Id. at art. 4; Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 93, at art. 3(b)(2).
96. TEU, supra note 94, at art. 5.
[I]n areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union
shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central
level or at regional and local level, but can either be by reason of the scale
or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.
Id.; See also Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 93, at art. 5(3) (setting forth the
means by which the TEU will be applied).
97. Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 93, at art. 3(b)(3).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Koen Lenaerts, The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Environment in
the European Union: Keeping the Balance of Federalism, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
846, 848 (1993).
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EU issues in regard to subsidiarity and climate change arise
when nation-states balk at accepting federalization of policy and
institute national and local policies instead. 101 Complicating this
further has been the EU’s willingness to support national climate
change adaptation and mitigation programs, believing that such
programs will eventually be consolidated.102 The result has been
that member states proactively acting on climate change have
focused more on national than on European goals. 103
In the EU, the European Committee of the Regions, the EU’s
political assembly of regional and local government entities,
represents sub-national governments in the EU’s decision-making
process.104 The regions and cities have become indispensable parts
of climate change negotiation, in no small part due to their expertise
in policy-making.105 In addition, the Covenant of Mayors, launched
by the European Commission in 2008, has brought together more
than 6,500 signatories, representing 210 million inhabitants,
further bringing multi-level governance to climate change.106 An
Integrated Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy now
addresses both climate change mitigation and climate change
adaption under a single entity.107

III. CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE EU: SUBSIDIARITY, THE
DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT, EFFICIENCY, AND THE EU LAWMAKING PROCESS
The EU’s multilevel governance goes under the principle of
subsidiarity, which is not focused on powers allocation, but rather
101. Andrew Jordan & Tim Jeppesen, EU Environmental Policy: Adapting
to the Principles of Subsidiarity?, 10 EUR. ENV. 64, 66 (2000).
102. Commission Green Paper on Adapting to Climate Change in Europe:
Options for EU Action, COM (2007) 354 (June 29, 2007), eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/ EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52007DC0354&qid =1488204560202
&from=EN.
103. Isabelle Niang-Diop & Henk Bosch, Formulating an Adaptation
Strategy, in ADAPTATION POLICY FRAMEWORKS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE:
DEVELOPING STRATEGIES, POLICIES & MEASURES, 185-86 (Bo Lim & Erika
Spanger-Siegfried eds., 2005).
104. THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW, GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL RESEARCH § 9.01 (1)(d)(iii)(B) (2018). See also European Committee of the
Regions
(CoR),
EUROPEAN UNION,
europa.eu/european-union/abouteu/institutions-bodies/european-committee-regions_en (last visited Apr. 7,
2019).
105. Cécile Barbière, Regions Push For Greater Influence in Climate
Negotiations, EURACTIV (Nov. 23, 2015), www.euractiv.com/section/climateenvironment/news/regions-push-for-greater-influence-in-climate-negotiations/.
106. Committee of the Regions, EU Cities and Regions Leading the Way
Against Climate Change: COP21 In Paris, at 17, EUROPEAN UNION (Nov. 2015),
cor.europa.eu/en/engage/brochures/Documents/EU%20cities%20and%20region
s%20leading%20the%20way%20against%20climate%20change/COP21.pdf.
107. Id.
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on the regulation of the use of powers between the EU and the
Member States.108
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union
shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at
central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason
of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at
Union level.109

Member States, however, are often unhappy about the
definition of what goes under EU control and what lies on their own
authority.
The wording of Article 5(3) raised well-founded doubts on the
legal nature of subsidiarity in the EU legal system. Whether the
principle of subsidiarity could be used as the legal basis in front of
the ECJ or whether it would only produce limited political effects is
still strongly debated.110 Such doubts regarding the criteria given in
paragraph two for justifying the EU action: “not sufficiently” and
“better” are indeed very ambiguous legal concepts.
That provision only regards the relationship between the
Community and the Member States and leaves the sub-national
level – mainly the regions – out.111 Moreover, it refers to the
relationship between the EU and the Member States as a whole, not
an individual State; but in some policy areas of the EU legal system,
powers are distributed differently.112 Finally, the principle of
subsidiarity concurs with other principles in the Treaty and cannot
claim priority in all cases.113
The lack of a secure legal basis has called for a general
consensus about the function of subsidiarity as a mere political
issue.114 A lot of EU policies are not competences exclusively given
108. See TEU, supra note 94, at art. 5(1) (stating that “[t]he limits of Union
competences are governed by the principle of conferral. The use of Union
competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality”
and Article 4 adds that “competences not conferred upon the Union in the
Treaties remain with the Member States.” Id. at art. 4).
109. Id. at art. 5(3).
110. See Gabriél A. Moens & John Trone, The Principle of Subsidiarity in
EU Judicial and Legislative Practice: Panacea or Placebo?, 41 J. LEGIS. 65, 7778 (2015) (explaining that the majority of constitutional courts focus on
subsidiarity as a legal issue).
111. Ian Bache, Multi-level Governance and European Union Regional
Policy, in MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE 165-78 (Ian Bache & Matthew Finders,
eds., 2004); Elizabeth Bomberg & John Peterson, European Union Decision
Making: The Role of Sub-National Authorities, 46 POL. STUD. 219, 219–35
(1998).
112. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 4(2), Oct. 26, 2012 O.J. (C 326/1) [hereinafter TFEU], art. 3-6.
113. Thomas Horsley, Subsidiarity and the European Court of Justice:
Missing Pieces in the Subsidiarity Jigsaw?, 50 J. OF COMMON MKT. STUD, 26782 (2012).
114. Andrea Biondi, Subsidiarity in the Courtroom, in EU LAW AFTER
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to the EU, and they fall into the so-called shared competences.115
Thus, the struggle between the communitarian and the
(inter)national approach (which is represented inside the very
European Union main institutions) asks to investigate what is the
legal basis, the most appropriate level of decision-making, and the
better trade-off about the way to legislate. 116 Those issues are still
of great relevance, because they have been the cause of many of the
restraints that EU regulation has had to face.117
EU lack of legitimacy is still widely claimed by the general
public opinion and most scholars.118 Yet, Member States’ interests
have not disappeared at the EU level. 119 Main reasons for the EU
institutions’ democratic deficit lie on the high rates of abstention in
the European Parliament elections.120 Others point out the absence
of an EU government voted in or out by citizens. 121 Thus, it is
unlikely for the people to express their direct approval or
disapproval of EU policies. As a result, “policy making at the EU
level can be characterized as policy without politics, which in turn
makes for national politics without policy, as increasing numbers of
policies are transferred from the national political arena to the
EU.”122
That is why the EU law-making process used to be so
burdensome. Political representations at the Parliament, Council,
and Commission levels often struggle to find agreements on
normative texts to reconcile the interests of the community with
those of the nation-states, both represented on the EU institutional
ground, causing broad inefficiency of the European law-making

LISBON 213, 216 (Andrea Biondi, Piet Eeckhout & Stefanie Ripley eds., 2012).
115. See TFEU, supra note 112, at art. 10-12 (setting out various policies to
follow under TFEU).
116. See PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND
MATERIALS 121-149 (5th ed., 2011) (analyzing the EU decision-making process).
117. See generally Robert Podolnjak, Explaining the Failure of the European
Constitution: A Constitution-Making Perspective, 57 COLLECTED PAPERS OF
ZAGREB L. FAC. 5 (2007) (analyzing voting and constitutions in the EU).
118. See CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 116, at 149-156 (evaluating
democracy in the EU and the lack of legitimacy argument).
119. Joseph H. H. Weiler, European Models: Polity, People and System, in
LAWMAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 9-17 (Paul Craig & Carol Harlow eds.
1998).
120. See 2019 European election results, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, (June 24,
2019), www.election-results.eu/turnout/ (setting forth the turnout in the EU
Parliament elections since 1979, showing how differently EU voters have been
participating to the polls, and showing how each single Country’s turnout has
been decreasing through time).
121. Weiler, supra note 119, at 4-5 (defining the EU’s undemocratic
governmental structure as “inverted regionalism”). See also CRAIG & DE BÚRCA,
supra note 116, at 150 (pointing to the central power of decision-making in
Brussels).
122. Vivian A. Schmidt, Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union
Revisited: Input, Output and ‘Throughput’, 61 POL. STUD. 2, 12 (2013).
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process.123 Politics and procedures have often failed to keep up with
the timing of the actual needs of Member States and their
populations.124
The Treaty of Lisbon introduced two different institutional
tools to try and ease the law-making process. On the one hand, it
introduced the so-called “early warning system,” to make the
nation-states more involved in the monitoring of the principle of
subsidiarity and proportionality (which enhances legitimacy in the
EU).125 On the other, it introduced the so-called “conciliation
procedure” after the (fruitless) second reading of the ordinary
legislative procedure, to give the Parliament and the Council the
chance to find an agreement on any proposed legislative text (which
apparently reduces legitimacy in the EU). 126
Was it enough? Were those tools capable to solve the
inefficiency-legitimacy deficit ratio of the EU law-making process?

A. Toward a Major Role of the Nation-States
When compared to the American federal system, the EU
contains a rather complicated system of division of powers between
the Member States and the Union, which the European Treaties
have essentially codified.127
The basis of the principle of subsidiarity lies in the social
doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church, because it can be seen as
an adaptation of that principle to European Union governance.128
Within the European Community, the principle of subsidiarity
appeared for the first time in the Report on European Union in
1975129 and later in the European Parliament's Draft Treaty on
123. CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 116, at 150.
124. Id.
125. Protocol (No. 2) on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and
Proportionality art. 6, OFFICIAL J. OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, C 202/206 (2009),
ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/protocol_no_2_on_the_application_of_the_prin
ciples_of_subsidiarity_and_proportionality_dec2004_en.pdf
[hereinafter
Subsidiarity and Proportionality].
126. TFEU, supra note 112, at art. 294.
127. Rudolf Hrbek, The Role of the Regions in the EU and the Principle of
Subsidiarity, 38 THE INT’L SPECTATOR 59, 69 (2008).
128. Michelle Evans, The Principle of Subsidiarity in European Union Law:
Some Comparisons with Catholic Social Teaching, 3 SOLIDARITY 61, 62 (2013).
Subsidiarity’s core is that the action of a larger group should be restricted to
supporting individuals or smaller groups only if they are incapable of
performing the task. Id. The higher authority is not allowed to take action which
the lower level government is capable of well performing on its own (more
efficient action is not a sufficient criterion). Id. If this is not the case, then the
higher authority is obliged to give support. Id.
129. Leo Tindemans, Report on European Union, BULL. OF THE EUR. COMTY,
(Supp. 1/76 1975), aei.pitt.edu/942/1/political_tindemans_report.pdf. The
Report on the European Union was published on December 29, 1975 and
presented to the European Council in Luxembourg on April 2, 1976. The
Tindemans Report, CVCE.EU, www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/
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European Union of 1984.130 It was first implemented, however, with
the Single European Act of 1987 (subsidiarity then referred only to
environmental policy) and then extended to all fields of shared
competence by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. 131 Until the Lisbon
Treaty, however, it has only served as a symbolic principle because,
on the one hand, it did not play an essential role in the legislative
actions by both the European Parliament (“EP”) and national
parliaments; and on the other hand, courts only reviewed the
procedure and the reasoning for policy measures in a very marginal
way.132 There is a general feeling amongst legal scholars that the
principle of subsidiarity is a “non-binding political principle,” i.e., a
principle of which the enforcement thereof essentially must lie in
the hands of political institutions. 133 Therefore, as detailed in the
following paragraphs, the role of the national parliaments and the
courts in enforcing the principle of subsidiarity has been widely
limited.134
02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/63f5fca7-54ec-4792-8723-1e626324f
9e3 (last visited Mar. 21, 2019). The Report “advocated consolidation of the
existing institutions and the development of common policies. It wanted to
extend the powers and authority of the Commission and, to this end, proposed
that the President should be appointed by the Council and approved by the
European Parliament.” Id. The Report “also wanted to strengthen the powers of
the European Parliament, the Members of which he wanted to see elected by
universal suffrage before the end of 1978, by conferring on it the right to propose
legislation, a right . . . the sole prerogative of the Commission” so far. Id. The
Report “also advocated the extension of majority voting in the Council and
changing the period when each Member State held the Council Presidency from
the current six months to one year.” Id.
130. Commission of the Eur. Communities, Draft Treaty Establishing the
European Union, 2 BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES 7, 9 (1984), aei.pitt.edu/
65287/1/BUL273.pdf.
The European Parliament adopt[ed] a draft Treaty on European Union,
also known as the ‘Spinelli draft’, with a view to bringing about a reform
of the Community institutions. Despite the limited impact of the draft
Treaty, its adoption motivates the governments of the Member States of
the Communities to propose a treaty, the draft Single European Act, in
December 1985.
Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union (14 February 1984),
CVCE.EU, www.cvce.eu/en/obj/draft_treaty_establishing_the_european_union_
14_february_1984-en-0c1f92e8-db44-4408-b569-c464cc1e73c9.html (last visited
Mar. 21, 2019).
131. TEU, supra note 94, at art. 3b.
132. See Biondi, supra note 114, at 214, 218, 227 (concluding that the
introduction of the concept of subsidiarity has been a gradual process and was
only considered marginally at first).
133. ELIES STEYGER, EUROPE AND ITS MEMBERS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
APPROACH 64 (1995); Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle
of International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J INT’L L. 38, 38 (2003); PHILIPP
KIIVER, THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A CRITICAL
VIEW ON EU CONSTITUTION-BUILDING 157–58 (2006).
134. Nicolas de Sadeleer, Principle of Subsidiarity and the EU
Environmental Policy, 9 J. EUR. ENVTL & PLAN. L. 63, 65 (2012).
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This is probably the reason why the Treaty of Lisbon
introduced significant new elements, along with the annexed
Protocols on the Role of National Parliaments in the EU and on the
Application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. The
Protocols ensure the Member States, the Committee of the Regions,
and the Court of Justice play a major role in the ex-ante political
control of the respect of the principle of subsidiarity by EU bodies. 135
According to the Protocols, national parliaments are now asked
to check all legislative proposals for their compatibility with
subsidiarity through the so-called early warning system. 136 The
Committee of the Regions is now entitled to bring legal actions
before the ECJ.137 Consequently, the ECJ is given a specific
jurisdiction to hear actions sued by the Member States - on behalf
of their national parliament or a chamber of it - and the Committee
of the Regions for the respect of the principle of subsidiarity. 138
The two Protocols establish a dual system. One provides for the
transmission from the Commission to national parliaments (at the
same time as to the EP and the Council) of both “consultation
documents” and “draft legislative acts” granting nation-states
unlimited scrutiny over them.139
Article 5 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of
subsidiarity and proportionality states that “Draft European
legislative acts shall be justified with regard to the principles of
subsidiarity and proportionality.”140 This provision introduces the
early warning system provided by Articles 6 and 7, which includes
the possibility for national parliaments (or each chamber of national
parliaments, in the case of bicameral systems) to send a reasoned
opinion “stating why it considers that the draft in question does not

135. Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe - Protocols and Annexes
- 1. Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union, 2004
O.J. (C 310) 204; Official Journal of the European Union, Protocol on the
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, C 310/207,
16.12.2004. Both Protocols come from the working group appointed during the
Laeken European Council (2001) which highlighted that the principle of
subsidiarity is essentially political and that the responsibility for it should
therefore rest with political bodies. In its final report, the working group
recommended, on the one hand, to setting up a political early warning system
to strengthen the national parliaments’ monitoring of the principle of
subsidiarity; on the other hand, to expanding the scope to referral to the ECJ
on grounds of failure to comply with the principle of subsidiarity. Conclusions
of Working Group I on the Principle of Subsidiarity, CONV 286/02, Brussels,
2002.
136. Subsidiarity and Proportionality, supra note 125, at art. 6, 8.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at art. 2, 3 (extending to eight weeks the period that shall elapse
between a draft legislative act being made available to national parliaments in
the official languages of the Union and the date when it is placed on the
provisional agenda of the Council for its adoption (after the following ten days)).
140. Id. at art. 5.
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comply with the principle of subsidiarity.”141
The Commission “shall take account of the reasoned opinions
issued by national parliaments or by a chamber of national
Parliament.”142 Each parliament has two votes. 143 In the case of a
bicameral system, each chamber shall have one vote. 144 When
reasoned opinions represent at least one third (one quarter on the
area of freedom, security, and justice) of the votes allocated to
national parliaments, “the draft must be reviewed.”145 However, the
Commission is still not bound by the reasoned opinions because it
can decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the act, giving reasons
for its decision.146
Paragraph 3 of Article 7 includes another additional
guarantee, the so-called “orange card.”147 Under the ordinary
legislative procedure, when reasoned opinions on the noncompliance with the principle of subsidiarity represents at least a
simple majority of the votes of national parliaments, the
Commission can still decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the
proposal.148 However, if the proposal is maintained, the Commission
must, in a reasoned opinion, justify why it considers that the
proposal complies with the principle of subsidiarity.149 As the
second subparagraph of Article 7(3) states,
This reasoned opinion, as well as the reasoned opinions of national
parliaments shall be submitted to the Union legislator, for
consideration in the procedure: (a) before concluding the first reading,
the co-legislators (the EP and the Council) shall consider whether the

141. Id. at art. 6(1); Roberta Panizza, The Principle of Subsidiarity,
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (2018), europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/7/theprinciple-of-subisidiarity.
142. Subsidiarity and Proportionality, supra note 125, at art. 7(1).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at art. 7(2).
146. Id. The mechanism, by analogy with soccer jargon, has been defined as
a yellow and not as a red card system. Jean-Victor Louis, National Parliaments
and the Principle of Subsidiarity - Legal Options and Practical Limits, 4 EUR.
CONST. L. REV. 429, 431 (2008). As Louis points out:
Some members of the Convention had preferred the establishment of a
red card system but this idea was discarded essentially in order to avoid
infringing the monopoly of initiative of the Commission maintained as a
principle in the Lisbon Treaty, the principle of the necessity for the
Council to be unanimous in order to amend a proposal of the
Commission.
Id. at 438.
147. Subsidiarity and Proportionality, supra note 125, at art. 7(3). That
nickname comes from traffic lights, but it also keeps trace of its Dutch
Government original proposal. It stresses the fact that “opinions of national
parliaments are not sufficient in order to block the proposal”; Louis, supra note
146, at 438.
148. Subsidiarity and Proportionality, supra note 125, at art. 7(3).
149. Id.

278

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[52:257

legislative proposal is compatible with the principle of subsidiarity,
taking particular account of the reasons expressed and shared by the
majority of national parliaments as well as the reasoned opinion of
the Commission; (b) if, by a majority of 55 percent of the members of
the Council or a majority of the votes cast in the EP, the legislators
are of the opinion that the proposal is not compatible with the
principle of subsidiarity, the legislative proposal shall not be given
further consideration.150

It is likely to assume that the Member States’ and judicial
control over the respect of the competences conferral to the EU
would be more effective in the future, in spite of what happened so
far. A significant argument for that may already be found in the
German and Czech Constitutional Court’s (so-called) Lisbon
Rulings, which held that every transfer of competences needs a
clear “delimitation” of the transferred powers in order to allow the
national parliaments to predict the degree to which competences are
actually transferred to the EU.151 According to the latter, rather
than address preliminary proceedings to the ECJ when in doubt
about European law (as stated in the Treaties), both Constitutional
Courts announced the will to keep their own authority to decide
whether EU regulations are compatible with the “remaining
national identity” of their sovereign countries.152
1. National Parliaments and the Early Warning System
Since the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was
signed in Rome in October 2004, national parliaments have had and
played a very marginal role in the subsidiarity check during the EU
law-making process.153 They could only be found with reference to
ensuring compliance with the principle of subsidiarity in accordance
with the procedure set out in the Protocol. 154 They are also
mentioned in Article I-18, where the EU Commission shall draw
national parliaments’ attention to proposals for monitoring the

150. Id.
151. BVerfG, Judgement of the Second Senate of Jun. 30, 2009, 2 BvE 2/08,
bundesverfassungsgericht.de/
entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html; Petr Bříza, The Czech
Republic: The Constitutional Court on the Lisbon Treaty Decision of 26
November 2008, 5 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 143, 152 (2009).
152. See THE GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S LISBON RULING: LEGAL
AND POLITICAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 45 (A. FISCHER-LESCANO, C. JOERGES
& A. WONKA eds., 2010) (pointing out, “[i]n its ruling, the GCC gives itself the
right to judge over ultra vires and sufficient remaining national identity. It is
critical that it usurps itself this right, rather than announcing to address
preliminary proceedings to the ECJ when in doubt about European law”).
153. Louis, supra note 146, at 431; Jit Peters, National Parliaments and
Subsidiarity: Think Twice, 1 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 68, 70 (2005).
154. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe art. 1-11(3), Oct. 29,
2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 20.
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subsidiarity principle.155
Further, the only reference to national parliaments in Title VI
on “The Democratic Life of the Union” could be found in a provision
on “Representative Democracy.”156 It mentions the democratic
responsibilities of the heads of State or of Government, or
governments (composing respectively the European Council and the
Council) either to their national parliaments, or to their citizens. 157
On the one hand, the accent is on the control of the Governments as
members of the Council, especially in the elaboration of EU
legislation; on the other hand, it is on the active contribution of
national parliaments to Union's affairs.
The Treaty of Lisbon now provides for a complement to the
early warning system in the control of the application of the
principle of subsidiarity in family law with cross-border
implications,158 which introduces a new possibility for national
parliaments to veto the use of a so-called “passerelle procedure”
which, according to Article 48 TEU, allows the switch to a different
kind of legislative procedure.159
Title II – “Democratic principles” – of the modified TEU
includes a new Article 12 on the active contribution of national
parliaments “to the good functioning of the Union.” 160 They take
155. Id. at art 1-18 at 24.
156. Id. at art. 1-46 at 40.
157. Id.
158. TFEU, supra note 112, at art. 81(3).
159. TEU, supra note 94, at art. 48 states that,
Where the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or Title V
of this Treaty provides for the Council to act by unanimity in a given area
or case, the European Council may adopt a decision authorising the
Council to act by a qualified majority in that area or in that case. This
subparagraph shall not apply to decisions with military implications or
those in the area of defence.
Where the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides for
legislative acts to be adopted by the Council in accordance with a special
legislative procedure, the European Council may adopt a decision
allowing for the adoption of such acts in accordance with the ordinary
legislative procedure.
Any initiative taken by the European Council on the basis of the first or
the second subparagraph shall be notified to the national Parliaments.
If a national Parliament makes known its opposition within six months
of the date of such notification, the decision referred to in the first or the
second subparagraph shall not be adopted. In the absence of opposition,
the European Council may adopt the decision.
For the adoption of the decisions referred to in the first and second
subparagraphs, the European Council shall act by unanimity after
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, which shall be given
by a majority of its component members.
Id.
160. Id. at art. 12.
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part in the inter-parliamentary cooperation, among national
parliaments, each other, and with the European Parliament. 161
National parliaments also get informed by having draft legislative
acts of the Union forwarded to them (in accordance with the Protocol
on the role of national parliaments in the EU) for checking whether
the principle of subsidiarity is respected (in accordance with the
procedures provided for in the Protocol on the application of the
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality).162
Yet, the Commission keeps stating that the principle of
subsidiarity is not being observed in an appropriate way. 163 The
2014 Commission’s Annual Report on Subsidiarity and
Proportionality stated that the reasoned opinions on alleged breach
of the principle of subsidiarity received by the Commission from
national parliaments in 2014 represented a decrease of 76%
compared to the number of reasoned opinions received in the
previous years.164 Further, the reasoned opinions received in 2014
accounted for a considerably lower proportion (4%) of the overall
number of opinions received by the Commission in the same year in
the wider context of the political dialogue. 165 The majority of
national chambers thus issued one or no reasoned opinions. 166
According to the decrease of reasoned opinions produced by
national parliaments, one may think about a significant improving
of the respect of the principle of subsidiarity by the EU institutions.
However, the smaller number of reasoned opinions must be seen in
the light of the decrease in the overall number of legislative
proposals issued by the Commission towards the end of its term of
office and not as an indication of an increased satisfaction by
national parliaments in subsidiarity matters.167 As the Commission
reports, “[a]lthough national parliaments were less active in terms
of issuing reasoned opinions in 2014, a growing number of national
chambers called for strengthening of the subsidiarity control
procedure.”168 The Danish Folketing169, the Dutch Tweede

161. Id. at art. 12 (f).
162. Id. at art. 12 (a) and (b).
163. Commission Annual Report 2014 on Subsidiarity and Proportionality,
at 4, COM (2015) 315 final (Feb. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Commission 2014 Report].
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 5.
167. Diane Fromage, Regional Parliaments and the Early Warning System:
An Assessment Six Years After the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty, Luiss
School of Government, Working Paper Series 5 (2016).
168. 2014 Report, supra note 163, at 5.
169. EUROPEAN AFFAIRS COMM., DANISH PARLIAMENT, TWENTY-THREE
RECOMMENDATIONS TO STRENGTHEN THE ROLE OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN
CHANGING EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE (2014).
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Kamer,170 and the UK House of Lords171 submitted reports with
ideas on how to extend the scope of subsidiarity control.172 “They
suggested that reasoned opinions should not only concern
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, but also compliance
with the principle of proportionality or the legal basis for the
proposal.”173 “The reports also advocated an extension of the
deadline for submitting reasoned opinions and proposed that when
a ‘yellow card’ is triggered, the Commission should be bound to
withdraw or amend its proposal.”174
Since those provisions have a purely indicative value (and thus
no normative value), they include different tools of intervention of
national parliaments in the context of EU lawmaking. Those tools
show how data on reasoned opinions are not reliable of a better
satisfaction with the respect of the principle of subsidiarity on
national parliaments’ side.175
Consistently, in 2016, the Commission kept practicing the
Better Regulation agenda on assessing subsidiarity in the policymaking process.176 Those guidelines, first adopted in 2015 and
amended in 2017, require the Commission to carry out a
subsidiarity analysis for every new both legislative and nonlegislative initiative or proposals in matters included in the sharing
competence areas.177 According to the guidelines, the aim of the
analysis is twofold: first, “to assess whether action at national,
regional or local level is sufficient to achieve the objective pursued;
second, to assess whether Union action would provide added value
over action by the Member States.”178
When considering a new policy process, the Commission
publishes a preliminary description of the envisaged initiative along
with inception impact assessments, also including an initial
justification as regards to subsidiarity.179 During the policy
development process, subsidiarity aspects are analyzed through an
open public consultation. 180 The results are then submitted to the
170. Dutch Tweede Kamer, Ahead in Europe: On the Role of the Tweede
Kamer and National Parliaments in the EU, TWEEDE KAMER (May 9, 2014),
www.houseofrepresentatives.nl/sites/default/files/news_items/ahead_in_europ
e_tc m181-238660_0.pdf.
171. Commission 2014 Report, supra note 163, at 5; BRITISH HOUSE OF
LORDS, EUROPEAN UNION COMM., THE ROLE OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION (2014).
172. Commission 2014 Report, supra note 163, at 5.
173. Panizza, supra note 141.
174. Commission 2014 Report, supra note 163, at 5.
175. Panizza, supra note 141.
176. Commission Staff Working Document on Better Regulation Guidelines,
SWD (2017) 350 final (July 7, 2017).
177. Id.
178. Annual Report 2016 on Subsidiarity and Proportionality, at 3, COM
(2017) 600 final (June 30, 2017).
179. Id. at 2.
180. Id.
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independent evaluation of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board. 181
Finally, the explanatory memorandum summarizes how the respect
of the principle of subsidiarity is met. 182
2. The (Committee of the) Regions Bringing Legal Actions
Before the Court of Justice
The expression “Europe of the Regions” has been used in the
EU with a broad range of meanings.183 In general terms, “Region”
refers to a geographic portion of land. However, in the European
history, Regions have also assumed special features giving an area
a distinct character from an economic perspective, or an
administrative entity, or even a political body generating a feeling
of identity – religious, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, historic – among
the inhabitants.184 Also their denomination varies widely: Lander
(Germany), Regioni (Italy), Comunidades Autonomas (Spain),
Regions (UK) are only some examples.
That concept basically means processes of regionalization or
federalization, by which territorial entities (below the level of the
nation state) have acquired a more autonomous status and wider
authority within the nation state.185 For others, because the nation
states are no longer capable of performing their tasks and functions
properly, they have been substantially replaced by smaller
territorial units (Regions) as the new basic component parts of the
international system “beyond the nation state.”186 Whichever
definition one may agree with, it seems that Regions count more
than before in the EU legal system and form a separate level within
its multi-level governance system.
There has been a general trend throughout Europe favoring
the sub-national level over the past two to three decades, through
the “top-down” or “bottom-up” regionalism.187 A number of reasons
181. Id.
182. Id. at 3.
183. Hrbek, supra note 127, at 59.
184. Id. at 60.
185. Thomas Vandamme, Still the Committee of ‘Legislative Regions’? On
Heterogeneity, Representation and Functionality of the Committee of the Regions
After 2004, AMSTERDAM CTR. FOR EUR. L. GOVERNANCE 9-10 (2013).
186. See Jurgen Habermas, Beyond the Nation State?, 10 PEACE REV. 235,
235-39 (2008) (explaining the changing development of nation-states as no
longer being relied upon for their original functionality).
187. See Hrbek, supra note 127, at 60-61 (pointing out, “[i]n the nineties,
Belgium underwent a thorough state reform, transforming a centralist into a
federal system; the new Belgian constitution, which entered into force in 1994,
provides for Regions and Communities as sub-national territorial entities. The
transformation in Spain (beginning in the late seventies) from an authoritarian
regime to democracy was accompanied by the re-introduction of territorial units
possessing particular powers and allowing for the emergence and consolidation
of regional identity. Under the term ‘devolution’, the United Kingdom adopted
a territorial structure (1998/99) by which Scotland and Wales were given their
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may explain that trend. Solutions taken at state level, away from
populations affected by them, are no longer regarded as appropriate
because of their lack of democracy or legitimacy.188 Input from below
is seen as necessary and in most cases, implementation is done at
the lower level.189 This is especially true at the European level
where population in smaller regions now asks for greater regional
autonomy to escape from the big economic crisis, since market
integration has increased disparities between different areas. 190
The growing role of sub-national territorial entities in their
nation-states have required a principle to guide the interaction
between them and the wider EU legal system. It has been a
practical necessity and reflects the growing role that the Committee
of the Regions191 has been playing over the last few years, especially
own institutions (a directly elected assembly and an executive accountable to
this assembly) with genuine powers. France and Italy continue their
developments towards regionalization and in an established federal system, like
that of Germany, the Lander are trying to strengthen their position. Finally,
one should not forget that processes of decentralization and formal
regionalization have taken place in Central and Eastern European applicant
countries”).
188. See Art. 114, 117 Constituzione [Cost.] (It.) (defining legislative powers
in Italy and the municipalities that make up the Republic).
189. Id.
190. See generally GIOVANI COINU, GIANMARIO DEMURO, FRANCESCO MOLA,
La specialità sarda alla prova della crisi economica globale, EURAC, ESI, 2017
(reporting the results of a survey showing that the best solution to exit the
economic crisis that began in 2008 would be the request for greater autonomy
from the National Government). In Italy, there are ongoing legislation proposals
by Lombardia, Veneto and Emilia-Romagna (the three richest regions in Italy)
to obtain wider autonomy for managing schools, healthcare, and justice under
the provision of Article 116.3 of the Italian Constitution:
Additional special forms and conditions of autonomy, related to the areas
specified in art. 117, paragraph three and paragraph two, letter l) limited to the organizational requirements of the Justice of the Peace and letters n) and s), may be attributed to other Regions by State Law,
upon the initiative of the Region concerned, after consultation with the
local authorities, in compliance with the principles set forth in art. 119.
Said Law is approved by both Houses of Parliament with the absolute
majority of their members, on the basis of an agreement between the
State and the Region concerned.
Art. 116.2 Constituzione [Cost.] (It.). See also Catalonia Crisis in 300 Words,
BBC (June 11, 2019), www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41584864 (showing a
good example of legislative proposals to obtain wider autonomy. During the
2017 Catalan Constitutional crisis in Spain, a referendum was held for getting
the Catalan independency from the Government of Spain. Catalonia is the
richest region in the country. The nationalist party won the referendum (and
the subsequent regional elections in December 2017), but the Spanish
Constitutional Court held that referendum illegal, notwithstanding 90% of
Catalan people backed independence).
191. Enrico Borghi, The Development of the Committee of the Regions, in
GOVERNING EUROPE UNDER A CONSTITUTION 445 (Herm.-Josef Blanke & Stelio
Mangiameli Mangiameli eds., 2006); Susana Boras-Alomar et al., Towards a
Europe of the Regions? Visions and Reality form a Critical Perspective, 4
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after the entrance into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.
At the beginning of the former European Economic Community
it was already clear that regional policy at the European level would
have had a relevant consistency, at least in terms of budgeting
massive special development funds for the less developed areas. 192
That was probably the main reason for regional authorities to want
to be directly involved in European policy-making.193 Some of the
regions were already entitled with a high level of autonomy in their
national states, where they could indeed exercise legislative
authority. Thus, it is not surprising that German Lander and
Belgians Communautés were the main advocates (where United
Kingdom and France were instead opposed) for the
institutionalization of the Committee of the Regions since the
preparation of Treaty of Maastricht (1992). 194 This is true, even
though it was done with mere advisory powers and only in limited
and specific areas of the whole EU legislative authority.195 With
Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, the Committee’s power was
strengthened by expanding the EU policy areas where its advisory
opinion was mandatory.196
It was only with the Treaty of Lisbon that the Committee of the
Regions was given a more significant role in the EU legislative
process: on the one hand, through the further increasing of areas of
mandatory consultation;197 on the other hand, through the right
granted to the Committee to bring legal actions before the Court of
REGIONAL POL. & POL’Y 1, 35-37 (1994).
192. See History of the Policy, EUR. COMM’N, ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/
en/policy/what/history/ (last visited May 1, 2019) (setting forth a timeline of the
start of the European Economic Community).
193. Peter Van Der Knaap, The Committee of the Regions: the Outset of a
‘Europe of the Regions’?, 4 REGIONAL POL. & POL’Y 86 (1994).
194. See Art. 117 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (noting, “Legislative powers shall
be vested in the State and the Regions in compliance with the Constitution and
with the constraints deriving from EU legislation and international
obligations.”); Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], art. 70(1) (explaining, “The
Länder shall have the right to legislate insofar as this Basic Law does not confer
legislative power on the Federation.”); 1994 Const. art. 127-133 (Belg.) (setting
forth the responsibilities of the Communities); C.E., B.O.E. n. 143 , Dec. 29,
1978 (Spain) (recognizing that when self-governance is implemented,
“bordering provinces with common historic, cultural and economic
characteristics, insular territories and provinces with a historic regional status
may accede to self-government and form Self-governing Communities
(Comunidades Autónomas) in conformity with the provisions contained in this
Part and in the respective Statutes”).
195. See Vandamme, supra note 185, at 13 (explaining the non-binding
advice that was permitted to be put forth).
196. Id.
197. See TFEU, supra note 112, at art. 91 (Transport), art. 102 (Air
Transport), art. 148 (Employment Policy), art. 153, art. 164 (European Social
Fund), art. 165 (Education), art. 166 (Vocational Training), art. 167(5), art.
168(4) (health care), art. 168(5), art. 172 (Trans European Networks), art. 175,
art. 177 (Structural Funds), art. 178 (European Regional Development Fund),
art. 192 (Environment), art. 194 (Energy).
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Justice for protecting its prerogatives.198 In the past this same kind
of privilege was given to the EP in the Treaty of Nice; thus some
have pointed out that it is likely that, “in the future, the ECJ might
opt for a broader legal interpretation of this right,” as it has already
occurred with the EP.199
Some authors have pointed out that the EU is deeply
characterized by a division of public authority alongside only two
centers, the national and the supranational, and there is no room
for interpreting subsidiarity as the tool by which “regional
authorities are portrayed as […] active insiders to EU affairs.” 200 In
that given context, the Committee played a very marginal role on
monitoring the subsidiarity principle.201
The higher role of the Committee after Lisbon is ensured by
the new wording of Article 5.3 TEU which limits EU action if goals
“cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States either at
central or at regional and local level.”202 The Committee has always
favored this wider notion of subsidiarity, and the Protocol No. 2, on
the application of the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality,
has finally accorded to the Committee the right to initiate direct
subsidiarity review before the EU Court of Justice over EU
legislative acts in areas of mandatory consultation.203
In the meantime, the Committee of the Regions adopted its
second “Subsidiarity Work Programme” in 2014, which included
selected initiatives according to specific criteria set in
environmental policies.204 However, “several respondents raised
concerns about proportionality, questioning the feasibility of the
new...targets...and highlighting the different approaches...
throughout the EU.”205 Several opinions adopted by the Committee
of the Regions raised concerns in terms of compliance of
Commission proposals with the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality.206 Since the Commission proposals are hard to
change due to the complex bicameral legislative procedure of the
EU, successful influence on the Commission often would meet the
goal.207
The actual influence of the Committee of the Regions has been
largely neglected.208 However, those opinions do often produce
198. Id. at art. 263.
199. Vandamme, supra note 185, at 15.
200. Michèle Finck, Challenging the Subnational Dimensions of
Subsidiarity in EU Law, 8 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 5, 13 (2015).
201. Id.
202. TEU, supra note 94, at art. 5(3).
203. Subsidiarity and Proportionality, supra note 125, at art. 8.
204.Commission 2014 Report, supra note 163, at 7.
205. Id. at 8.
206. Id. at 8-11.
207. Id. at 12.
208. Marco Brunazzo & Ekaterina Domorenok, New Members in Old
Institutions: The Impact of Enlargement on the Committee of the Regions, 18
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effects on policy-making, both on the addressee and the final policy
outcome even though their recommendations are not binding. 209 As
some have pointed out, the actual influence of the Committee’s
advisory opinions relies on a number of variables: first, it is more
influential when the recommendation comes early in the formal
decision-making process, if the addressee believes that the
Committee has high expertise in the subject matter and only when
its position is close to the own position of the addressee. 210 Overall
it is proven that the Committee exercises a stronger influence in the
position of the addressee body than over the final policy outcome.211
That is, it is more likely to have a positive effect on the final policy
by influencing the initial position of the Commission, or the EP and
the Member States, very early in the process since the Committee
has no formal vote in the legislative procedure and it is excluded
from political negotiations between the EP, the Council and the
Commission.212
Protocol No. 2, however, now gives the Committee of the
Regions a powerful tool for strengthening its own role as watchdog
of the principle of subsidiarity acknowledging the Committee the
right to bring legal action before the ECJ against legislative acts on
which it was consulted.213
3. The Enforceability of the Principle of Subsidiarity
The practical application of the principle of subsidiarity has
been defined as “minimal”214 or “very timid”215 because it has “little
value as a standard of scrutiny,”216 or “largely inoperable at the
stage of adjudication,”217 or finally because subsidiarity is
“essentially a political and subjective principle.”218 Subsidiarity has
REGIONAL & FED. STUD. 429, 430 (2008); John Loughlin, Representing Regions
in Europe: The Committee of the Regions, in THE REGIONAL DIMENSION OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION: TOWARDS A THIRD LEVEL IN EUROPE? 147, 147-164 (Charlie
Jeffery ed., 1997).
209. Milena I. Neshkova, The Impact of Subsidiarity Interests in
Supranational Regulation, 17 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1193, 1193-1211 (2010).
210. Christoph Hönnige & Diana Panke, The Committee of the Regions and
the European Economic and Social Committee: How Influential Are
Consultative Committees in the European Union?, 51 J. COMMON MKT. STUD.
452, 452-471 (2013)
211. Id. at 453.
212. Id. at 455.
213. Subsidiarity and Proportionality, supra note 125, at art. 8.
214. Biondi, supra note 114, at 213.
215. Aurelian Portuese, The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Principle of
Economic Efficiency, 17 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 231, 247 (2011).
216. Christoph Ritzer, Marc Rutloff & Karin Linhart, How to Sharpen a Dull
Sword - The Principle of Subsidiarity and its Control, 7 GERMAN L.J. 733, 760
(2006).
217. EUROPEAN SCRUTINY COMMITTEE, SUBSIDIARITY, NATIONAL
PARLIAMENTS AND THE LISBON TREATY, 2007-8, HC 563, at Ev 3 (UK).
218. Committee of the Regions, Subsidiarity Annual Report 2011, 31 (2011),
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been always perceived as a political or a pre-legislative principle
instead of an actual legal and justiciable criterion for the allocation
of law-making authorities in the EU.219 Thus, the ECJ has exercised
little judicial review on it and many consider the failure of
subsidiarity as a judicial review principle in se because the ECJ has
adopted an excessively deferential approach to its judicial
enforcement, despite its well-known general judicial activism. 220
On the one hand, the ECJ has confirmed that subsidiarity does
not create individual rights under the Treaties, as it solely relates
to the division of powers between the Union and the Member
States,221 and has also held that the principle of subsidiarity is
justiciable (moving away from a previous contrary Advocate
General’s Opinion in Germany v. Parliament and Council222).
Nevertheless, the Court has never held, on the other hand, that any
EU legislative act was invalid for the breach of the principle of
subsidiarity.223
However, it is possible to find some major cases involving
subsidiarity which have been decided before the Lisbon Treaty was
entered into force.
In the Working Time Directive case, for example, the EU
provided for minimum working time and wages throughout the
Community.224 The United Kingdom argued that the legislator did
not give any evidence of how those aims were better achieved at the
Community level rather than at the national level. 225 The ECJ’s
decision, however, found it adequate because of the improvement of
the level of health and safety protection for the workers. 226
In the Deposit Guarantee case, the ECJ considered sufficient
the very general reasons given in the recitals, because they showed
the EU Parliament’s view for better achieving the goal at the
Community level since the previous action at national level proved

portal.cor.europa.eu/subsidiarity/Publications/Documents/SMN%20
Report%202011/SAR_2011_EN.pdf.
219. See generally Davor Petrić, The Principle of Subsidiarity in the
European Union: ‘Gobbledygook’ Entrapped Between Justiciability and Political
Scrutiny? The Way Forward, 6 ZPR 287-318 (2017) (explaining the criticisms
that have arisen over the functionality of subsidarity).
220. See Pranvera Bequiraj, Subsidiarity in the Jurisprudence of the Court
of Justice European Union, 5 MEDITERRANEAN J. OF SOC. SCI, 311, 312 (2014)
(discussing the limited and detached approach the ECJ has taken with
subsidiarity).
221. Case C-221/10, Artegodan GmbH v. European Commission, 2012
E.C.R. 3.
222. Biondi, supra note 114, at 216. The Advocate General’s Opinion in Case
C-376/98 argued that “there can be no test of ‘comparative efficiency’ between
potential Member State and Community action.” Id. at 216 n.10.
223. Moens & Trone, supra note 110, at 72.
224. Case C-84/94, United Kingdom v. Council, 1996 E.C.R. I-5758.
225. Id. at ¶ 46.
226. Id. at ¶ 47.
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insufficient. 227
In the Biotechnology case, the Court held that the
consideration of subsidiarity was necessarily implicit since the
different laws of the Member States, according to the need of the
protection of biotechnology, were an obstacle to the internal EU
market. 228
In the British American Tobacco case, the ECJ (examining for
the first time the argument on a substantive rather than procedural
grounds) held that the Directive did not go beyond what was
necessary to ensure the harmonization of Member states laws
regarding manufacture, presentation, and sale of tobacco products.
229

It was only in the Vodafone230 and in the Airport Charges231
cases that the EU regulation was expressly challenged for the
violation of the principle of subsidiarity. In Vodafone, the EU “set a
ceiling for both wholesale and retail charges” on mobile phone
roaming, considering it necessary for improving the internal
market.232 However, the Court, stated that the challenged
provisions were consistent with subsidiarity.233 In the latter case,
Luxembourg argued that the challenged Directive breached
subsidiarity because it applied to situations that could be regulated
at national level, but again, the ECJ upheld the Directive on the
ground that Luxembourg had not alleged sufficient details to permit
the Court to determine whether Member State laws would be
adequate to achieve the aim of the Directive.234
Though the ECJ had already confirmed that the subsidiarity
principle would still have been justiciable, the Lisbon Treaty and
the annexed Protocol No. 2 wording nonetheless make it clear that
subsidiarity is a judicially enforceable legal principle and give the
right to bring legal action on the ground of a possible breach of it. 235
Yet, “defining at what level a task is better accomplished is primarily
a political problem [and] it should therefore left to political
process.”236
227. Case C-233/94, Germany v. Parliament and Council, 1997 E.C.R. I2405; Moens & Trone, supra note 110, at 74.
228. Case C-377/98, Netherlands v. Parliament and Council, 2001 E.C.R. I7079; Moens & Trone, supra note 110, at 74.
229. Case C-491/01, The Queen. v. Sec’y of State for Health ex parte British
Am. Tobacco (Inv.) Ltd., 2002; Moens & Trone, supra note 110, at 74-75.
230. Case C-58/08, The Queen. v. Sec’y of State for Bus., Entm’t and
Regulatory Reform ex parte Vodafone Ltd., 2010 E.C.R. I-4999; Moens & Trone,
supra note 110, at 75.
231. Case C-176-09, Luxembourg v. Parliament and Council, 2011 E.C.R. I3727; Moens & Trone, supra note 110, at 76.
232. Moens & Trone, supra note 110, at 75.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 76.
235. Subsidiarity and Proportionality, supra note 125, at art. 8.
236. Renaud Dehousse, Does Subsidiarity Really Matter? EUI, EUI Working
Papers no. 92/93, at 21 (1992) (emphasis added).
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Article 8 of Protocol No. 2 now expressly provides that
The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction
in actions on grounds of infringement of the principle of
subsidiarity by a legislative act, brought in accordance with the
rules laid down in Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union by Member States, or notified by them in
accordance with their legal order on behalf of their national
Parliament or a chamber thereof. In accordance with the rules laid
down in the said Article, the Committee of the Regions may also
bring such actions against legislative acts for the adoption of which
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides
that it be consulted.237

On the one hand, the essential political value of the principle
is clear, as subsidiarity has been confirmed, even in the Protocol
wording. It provides, for instance, the right to bring legal action
before the ECJ to the Member States, their national parliaments (or
a chamber thereof) and the Committee of the Regions, which are
obviously political institutions.238
One may observe that the Protocol does not actually give a
direct right to bring judicial review proceedings for the breach of
subsidiarity, but they only can do so through proceedings notified
by the national government,239 and not all Member States regulate
the process by positive law yet.240 One may also observe that the
Committee of the Regions has to respect three pre-conditions in
order to bring a legal action for the breach of subsidiarity. 241 Yet,
the Protocol expressly devolves, for the first time, to ECJ the judicial
application of subsidiarity and it has already sorted some effects.
For instance, the Commission withdrew a proposed regulation on
collective action and the Committee of the Regions issued an opinion
which stated that
if the Commission had maintained its proposal . . . the Committee
could have considered taking the necessary steps to lodge an expost appeal against it for breaching the principle of subsidiarity in
terms of both the choice of legal basis and insufficient evidence of
the added value of EU action in this area.242

One may reasonably expect that the ECJ would bring a quali237. Subsidiarity and Proportionality, supra note 125, at art. 8.
238. Moens & Trone, supra note 110 , at 69.
239. Id. (citing Adam Cygan, Regional Governance, Subsidiarity and
Accountability within the EU’s Multi-level Polity, 19 EUR. PUB. L. 161, 169
(2013)).
240. Moens & Trone, supra note 110, at 70.
241. Id. at 71. According to Committee of the Regions Rules of Procedure R.
53(2), 2010 O.J. (L6) 14, “the act must have been subject to mandatory
consultation with the Committee, the challenged act must be a legislative act,
and the action must be brought within two months of the publication of the
challenged legislation.” Id.
242. Id. (quoting Committee of the Regions, The Posting of Workers in the
Framework of the Provision of Services, 2013 O.J. (C17) 67, 69).
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quantitative approach in the judgments, according with Article 5 of
the mentioned Protocol for evaluating whether a Union objective
can be better achieved at Union level (instead of at State level)
where both qualitative or, wherever possible, quantitative
indicators must be met.243 That may require the ECJ to develop a
new justiciability test to review whether the principle of
subsidiarity has been respected or not.
Should we expect a new era of subsidiarity case-law? The ECJ
has already given proof of its ability to manage vague legal concepts,
making it possible for the EU to move toward a higher standard of
multilevel constitutionalism.244 ECJ case-law had lead the
European integration, making it possible for the EU legal system to
improve its legal nature. The ECJ has explicitly recognized the
relevance of internal federal arrangements for the application of EU
law.245 Accordingly, even the “free movement principle”246 is not
recognized as absolute, but it has to be balanced with the need to
guarantee certain national public aims without the need of making
any reference to the principle of subsidiarity. 247
The wording of Article 8 of the Protocol No. 2 now enhances the
role of the Court, the national parliaments, and the Committee of
the Regions, and they have already shown their appreciation for the
opportunity to play a major role in the subsidiarity check process. 248
The main objections to a stronger judicial enforcement of
subsidiarity, as related to the ECJ, would be at “a comparative
disadvantage in relation to the Union institutions in terms of
legitimacy, resources, and competence.”249 According to its case-law
however, the Court could positively strengthen the judicial review
through a rigorous check on adequate reasoning along with relevant
evidence which justified the EU legislative intervention rather than

243. See PAUL CRAIG, EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 428 (3d ed. 2019)
(discussing judgments set forth according to Article 5).
244. Gareth Davies, Subsidiarity: The Wrong Idea, in the Wrong Place, at
the Wrong Time, 43 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 63, 63-64 (2006).
245. Case C-212/06, Gov’t of the French Cmty and Walloon Gov’t v. Flemish
Gov’t, 2008 E.C.R. I-1687; Case C-88/03, Portugal v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. I7119; Case T-211/04, Gibraltar v. Comm’n, 2008.
246. The “free movement principle” ensures the free movement of people,
workers, services, goods, and capital among the Member States of the EU. They
are the most influencing pillars of the historic EU integration path. See TFEU,
supra note 112, at Title IV.
247. See Case C-36/02, Omega [2004] (explaining the public policy
motivation behind restriction on the “free movement principle”); see also C-359360/04, Placanica [2007] (discussing infringements on the freedom of
movement).
248. Biondi, supra note 114, at 222. The former President of the Committee
of the Regions said that “[w]e will exercise this right with caution, but with
great conviction in cases where we feel it necessary to defend the subsidiarity
principle in EU lawmaking.” Id at 223.
249. Jacob Öberg, Subsidiarity as a Limit to the Exercise of EU Competences,
36 Y.B. EUR. L. 391, 406 (2016).
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nation-states.250 The toolbox now seems to be adequate: impact
assessments, explanatory memorandum, reports from national
parliaments and Committee of the Regions, and amendments to the
legislative proposal deriving from the EU institutions give the
Court the chance to consider whether there is adequate evidence
and reasoning to sustain the exercise of EU competence or not.

B. Trilogues and Subsidiarity, A Case Study: The
Amendment of Directive 96/71 on Posting of
Workers
The Annual Report 2016 Subsidiarity and Proportionality
identified 65 opinions from national parliaments discussing
subsidiarity.251 That number is seven times higher than opinions
raised in 2015, showing the increased interest by the Member
States on the new checking subsidiarity mechanism. 252
Whether the new early warning system along with the
Commission’s guidelines will be effective tools providing national
parliaments with a stronger and proactive role is yet to be proven.253
Some are rather skeptical, putting in doubt the practical
importance of the new powers on subsidiarity given to national
parliaments: they claim that the procedure created by the Protocol
is not the better way for national parliaments to make their voice
heard in the Union.254 A better guarantee for due respect of the
subsidiarity would “have been a requirement of an extra qualified
majority... within the Council and the European Parliament, in case
the national parliaments object on account of subsidiarity”255 or
introducing a so-called “green card” for allowing national
parliaments to propose new policies or legislation to the
Commission, including amending or repealing the existing EU
laws.256
A leading case is going to be the Commission’s amending
proposal of Directive 96/71 on posting of workers in 2016, since the
250. See Biondi, supra note 114, at 222 (presenting the caselaw that has
already been set forth with the adoption of subsidiarity).
251. Annual Report 2016 on Subsidiarity and Proportionality, supra note
178, at 7.
252. Id.
253. M. SEROWANIEC, Towards the Green Card – Strengthening the role of
national parliaments in EU Affairs?, TORUŃSKIE STUDIA POLSKOWŁOSKIE XI — STUDI POLACCO-ITALIANI DI TORUŃ XI - Toruń 2015,
dx.doi.org/10.12775/TSP-W.2015.002.
254. P. DE WILDE, Why the Early Warning System does not alleviate the
Democratic deficit, OPAL working paper, n. 6/2012.
255. Peters, supra note 153, at 72.
256. BRITISH HOUSE OF LORDS, supra note 171; SEROWANIEC, supra note
253; Diane Fromage, National Parliaments in the Juncker Commission Era: The
“Green Card” Initiative and Beyond, in 35 QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI 1024,
1024-26 (2015).
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more recent “yellow card” was triggered against that. 257 As
stipulated in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU and reinforced
by the case-law of the ECJ, the freedom of establishment and the
freedom to provide services guarantee the mobility of businesses
and professionals within the EU.258 However, with regard to the
posting of workers, as a specific type of cross-border labor mobility,
there is a need to balance internal market freedoms with measures
guaranteeing respect for the rights of workers.259 Currently, the
1996 Directive on the posting of workers is being revised to address
unfair practices experienced during its implementation where the
internal market freedoms have prevailed over the social rights of
workers.260
In the years following the adoption of that Directive, the
implementation, legal interpretation, and regulation of the special
case of posted workers exposed three specific challenges. Firstly, a
widening gap of wage differentials between Member States created
adverse incentives: labor cost differentials between countries with
the highest and lowest minimum wage levels, have changed from a
factor of 1:3 in 1999 to 1:10 in 2015.261 As wage gaps continue to
widen, and the overall labor costs continue to diverge between
countries, there is an increasing financial incentive, based on wage
competition, for businesses to use posted workers. 262 This incentive
is seen in practice with a 44.4% increase in the number of postings
between 2010 and 2014.263
Secondly, legal uncertainties and regulatory loopholes
facilitated malpractices: the Directive does not set out clear criteria
to define the temporary nature of work or what constitutes a
genuine posting from an ‘established’ firm in a Member State to an
undertaking in a host Member State.264 These ambiguities have led
to many concerns about the potential misuse of the Directive to
circumvent employment and social security legislation through
257. Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
16 December 1996 Concerning the Posing of Workers in the Framework of the
Provision of Services, OFFICIAL J. THE EUR. CMTY, No. L 18/1 (Jan. 1, 1997), eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31996L0071&from=en.
258. TFEU, supra note 112, at Title IV.
259. Id. at art. 45-48.
260. See DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES, POLICY
DEPARTMENT A: ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC POLICY, POSTING OF WORKERS
DIRECTIVE –CURRENT SITUATION AND CHALLENGES 45 (2016) [hereinafter
Directorate-General] (pointing out that the Commission “highlighted in
particular on the fact that the 1996 Directive no longer replies new realities
within the Single Market, namely the growth in wage differentials that create
unwanted incentives to use posting as a means for unfair competition”).
261. Minimum Wage Statistics, Eurostat Statistics Explained (Jan. 2019),
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Minimum_
wage_statistics; Directorate-General, supra note 260, at 38.
262. Directorate-General, supra note 260, at 38.
263. Id. at 15-16, 38.
264. Id. at 28.
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various loopholes such as rotational posting and letter-box
companies.265
Thirdly,
[i]n view of the social policy provisions introduced into the
European Treaties since the 2007 Lisbon Treaty revision, it is
questionable whether the 1996 Directive provides an adequate
legal instrument for ensuring a level playing field for free crossborder service provision while at the same time delivering an
adequate foundation for the social rights of workers. In cases
where the Directive leaves implementation and enforcement of
minimum standards of employment to Member States, it relies on
Court of Justice rulings to interpret the terminology in the
Directive. However, rulings since the adoption of the Directive
have not provided the necessary legal clarity. […] In addition, with
its four judgments in 2007/2008 in the cases Viking (C-438/05),
Laval (C-341/05), Rüffert (C-346/06) and Commission vs.
Luxembourg (C-319/06), the Court of Justice has turned the
employment standards originally conceived as minimum
standards in the Directive into a ‘maximum ceiling’ of terms and
conditions of employment. In the meantime, though, the Court has
issued two judgments with a more protective effect for posted
workers: in the Sähköalojen ammattiliittory case (C-396/13), it
ruled that categorizing workers in different pay groups which are
universally binding and transparent in a collective agreement has
to also be applied to posted workers. More recently, it ruled in the
Regio-Post case (C-115/14), that Member States can require
tenderers of public procurements and their subcontractors to pay
their employees a set minimum wage.266

According to its own political guidelines promoting the
principle, “the same work at the same place should be remunerated
in the same manner,” and the Commission thus adopted a
proposal267 for a targeted revision of the Directive on posting of
workers.268 The purpose was to ensure that the implementation of
the freedom to provide services in the Union would guarantee, at
the same time, a level playing field for businesses and respect for
the rights of workers.269 According to the proposal, all mandatory
rules on remuneration in the host Member State should be applied

15.

265. European Parliament, Working in the European Union, PE 600.417, at

266. Susanne Kraatz, Posting of workers, European Parliament - Fact sheets
on the European Union (Oct. 2018), www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/
en/sheet/37/posting-of-workers.
267. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
amending Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 16 December 1996 Concerning the Posting of Workers in the Framework of the
Provision of Services, COM (2016) 128 final (Mar. 8, 2016).
268. Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
16 December 1996 Concerning the Posting of Workers in the Framework of the
Provisions of Services, 1997 O.J. (L 18), 1, 1 (EC).
269. Id. at 2.
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to workers posted to that Member State.270
The Commission proposal elicited fourteen reasoned opinions
from national parliaments in eleven Member States. 271 According to
the Commission, these reasoned opinions represent “22 out of a total
of 56 votes, more than one-third of the total, thereby triggering the
procedure of the early warning under Article 7(2) of Protocol No. 2
to the Treaties (the so-called ‘yellow card’ procedure).”272 National
parliaments pointed out “(i) that existing rules were sufficient and
adequate, (ii) that the Union was not the adequate level of the
action, (iii) that the proposal fails to recognize explicitly Member
States' competences on remuneration and conditions of employment
and, (iv) that the proposal's justification with regard to the principle
of subsidiarity was too succinct.”273
In the auspice of improving the interaction with national
Parliaments, the Commission engaged directly with national
Parliaments and adopted a Communication concluding that since
“the proposal complies with the principle of subsidiarity it should
be maintained unchanged.”274 In its Communication, while
explaining why the rules in place are not sufficient and adequate to
achieve that objective, the Commission recalled that “posting, by
definition is of a cross-border nature” and workers carrying out
work at the same location have to be protected by the same
mandatory rules, irrespective of whether they are local or posted
workers.275 The Communication furthermore confirms the respect
of the Member States’ competences to set remuneration and
conditions of employment, in accordance with national laws and
practice.276 Finally, the Communication addressed the question of
justification of the proposal's compliance with the principle of
subsidiarity, recalling the case-law of the Court of Justice and
referring to the explanatory memorandum and the Impact

270. Id. at Article 1 Amendments to Directive 96/71/EC.
271. Before that the 2014 Enforcement Directive was an important step
forward in terms of giving the Directive on posting of workers the legal certainty
and structure for administrative coordination required for successful
implementation. However, the Enforcement Directive did not touch on the
substantive aspects of the posting of workers Directive. So, a second path to
reform is specifically targeted at bolstering the social rights of workers and
facilitating a better balance with economic rights of free service provision. Id.
at 2-3.
272. Annual Report 2016 on Subsidiarity and Proportionality, supra note
178, at 14.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, and the National Parliaments on the Proposal for a Directive
Amending the Posting of Workers Directive, with Regard to the Principle of
Subsidiarity, in Accordance with Protocol No. 2, at 4, COM (2016) 505 final (July
20, 2016).
276. Id.
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Assessment Report.277
This case is remarkable for at least two reasons. First, it is a
good example of national parliaments’ understanding and use of the
early warning system as a tool for going beyond the subsidiarity
scrutiny.278 It is worth noting that the national parliaments’
understanding is founded on a substantial political basis. 279 Second,
it is meaningful that the Commission maintained the original
proposal on exclusive procedural subsidiarity terms rather than the
political matters addressed by national parliaments.280
Authors have pointed out some significant aspects of this third
yellow card. First, the reasoned opinions come from a well-defined
territorial area corresponding to ten Eastern European countries
who joined the EU after 2004 enlargement. 281 Second, in this
specific case, the reasoned opinions presented are equal to the
political position already expressed by their Governments in the
Council during the co-legislative procedure.282 Finally, the reasoned
opinions are founded on a solid nationalistic basis to keep minimum
wages available for the (eastern) workers posted in the western and
wealthier countries.283
What it is really remarkable, however, is the third reason of
interest. For the first time ever, the debate about subsidiarity
crossed what is proving to be the major (although informal)
innovation in the law-making process in the EU institutional
history: trilogue agreements.
Trilogues are tripartite meetings, that is informal negotiations
on legislative proposals between the European Parliament, the
Council of the European Union and the European Commission
aimed at reaching early agreements on new EU legislation.
After the Commission held to maintain its proposal for the
revision of the Directive on posted workers, the inconsistent
positions of the EP and the Council suggested starting an informal
tripartite negotiation aimed to find a compromise agreement in the
first reading of the ordinary legislative procedure.284
277. Id. at 8-9.
278. Diane Fromage & Velentin Kreilinger, National Parliaments' Third
Yellow Card and the Struggle Over the Revision of the Posted Workers Directive,
10 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 125, 146-147, 159 (2017).
279. Id.
280. Id. at 152. However, the Commission has sent individual answers to
national parliaments, also addressing political issues. Id. at 159.
281. See id. at 126, 135 (exploring the introduction of subsidarity through
the Lisbon Treaty).
282. Id. at 156.
283. This same social dumping warning was the main cause for the failure
of French and Dutch referendum on the approval of European Constitution
Treaty in 2005. Robert Podolnjak, Explaining the Failure of the European
Constitution: A Constitution-Making Perspective, 57 Collected Papers of Zagreb
Law Faculty, 1-44 (Feb. 17, 2017), ssrn.com/abstract=963588.
284. See Marion Schmid-Drüner, The Revision of Posting of Workers
Directive, Directorate-General for Internal Policies - Policy Department for
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In the Parliament’s files, it is clear its focus on the Directive’s
revision is strengthening the commitment to guarantee a common
set of social rights in order to avoid unfair treatment by extending
the legal basis to the wider provision of Article 153 TFEU (EU social
policies) instead of keeping it under the freedom of services
regulation principles.285
Its negotiating mandate 286 was adopted by the plenary on
October 23, 2017 and includes some change requests to the
Commission proposal.287 The Council commitment has indeed two
core revisions at the heart of its general approach, coming after a
troubled EU Ministers meeting (which witnessed a total France
defeat) aimed to reach a broad support in order to have a stronger

Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies - PE 607.346 (Oct., 2017),
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/607346/IPOL_BRI(2017)
607346_EN.pdf (discussing the introduction of the use of the trilogues).
285. European Parliament Resolution of 16 February 2017 on Improving the
Functioning of the European Union Building on the Potential of the Lisbon
Treaty, 2014/2249 (INI).
286. European Parliament Press Release, Posting of Workers: EP Ready to
Start Negotiations with Member States (Oct. 25, 2017), www.europarl.
europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20171020IPR86571/posting-of-workers-epready-to-start-negotiations-with-member-states reports. After Council’s
decision to start the trilogue also the plenary of the Parliament decided over the
Employment Committee’s mandate proposal to trigger negotiations. The
rapporteurs for the issue at stake are Elisabeth Morin-Chartier (EPP, FR)
and Agnes Jongerius (S&D, NL) who declared,
now that Council is ready to join the European Parliament at the
negotiating table, we are very eager to finalise a Posting of Workers
Directive that is up to date and fit for purpose. Things are moving in the
right direction, but the devil is in the details. We will pay particular
attention to the road transport issue, to make sure that the revision
strikes the right balance between the freedom to provide services and
better protecting workers.
Id.
287. See European Parliament Press Release, Posted Worker: Better
Protection and Fair Conditions For All, (Oct. 16, 2017) www.europarl.europa.eu/
news/en/press-room/20171016IPR86114/posted-workers-better-protection-andfair-conditions-for-all (summarizing Parliament’s amendments requests as
follows: a) “all of the host country’s rules on remuneration, set by law or
collective agreements, should apply to posted workers,” and, “[m]ember States
should be obliged to publish all elements of their national remuneration policy,
as well as information on collective agreements, on a special website”; b)
Parliament has extended the conditions of employment posted workers enjoy on
a par with workers in the host state to the conditions of workers’ accommodation
and allowance rates to cover travel, board and lodging expenses for workers
away from their habitual place of work; c) “host[ing] Member States could opt
to apply regional or sectorial collective agreements, instead of national ones, if
they offer more favorable conditions for posted workers”; and d) the
Commission’s presumption on long-term posting is being taken up, subject to
the possibility to grant extensions to undertakings based on a reasoned request
made to the competent authority of the Member State where the worker is
posted).
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mandate for the trilogue.288
One of the main areas of confrontation during trilogues will be
the refusal by the Council to put the directive under article 153 of
the EU treaty, as required by the Parliament.289 The Council wants
a text aiming at the good functioning of internal market while the
Parliament is eager to protect workers.290
EU employment commissioner Marianne Thyssen said that
“there are always differences at the start of trilogue negotiations,
but that the institutions will sit together, exchange views and try to
convince each other to find a good positive compromise.” 291
Tripartite interinstitutional negotiations (trilogues) between
the Commission, Parliament and Council have started with the
hopes of reaching a first-reading agreement.292

C. Trilogues: Early Informal Negotiation at any Stage
of the Decision-Making Process
Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Council has been able to
adopt a legislative act at first reading if it approves all the
amendments contained in the European Parliament’s opinion. 293
This formal provision has offered an informal space that decisionmakers could (but need not) choose to fill.294
The word trilogues appeared for the first time in the 2007 Joint
Declaration by the three mentioned institutions on practical
arrangements for the codecision procedure.295 The declaration
288. Council of the European Union Press Release, Posting of Workers:
Council Reaches Agreement (Oct. 24, 2017) www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/
press-releases/2017/10/24/posting-of-workers-council-reaches-agreement/.
(reporting the Council found an agreement on reducing the possible length of
postings from 24 months (as proposed by the Commission) to 12 months with a
possibility of a 6-month extension). Further, the Council is not going as far as
Parliament in only applying universally applicable collective agreements to
posted workers across all sectors. Id.
289. See Caterina Tani, EU Posted Workers Face Hurdles, EUOBSERVER (Oct.
25, 2017), euobserver.com/social/139625 (reporting on the negotiations to agree
on the directive).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. After the trilogue, the EP and the Council eventually adopted in the
first reading of the ordinary legislative procedure the Directive (EU) 2018/957
on 28 June 2018 amending Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of
workers in the framework of the provision of services. Directive (EU) 2018/957of
the European Parliament and of the Council, 2018 O.J (L 173) 16,
data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/957/oj.
293. TFEU, supra note 112, at art. 294.
294. Michael Shackleton & Tapio Raunio, Codecision Since Amsterdam: A
Laboratory for Institutional Innovation and Change, 10 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 171,
173-74 (2003).
295. Joint Declaration, 2007/C 145/02, Joint Declaration on Practical
Arrangements for the Codecision Procedure (Article 251 of the EC Treaty), 2007
O.J. (C 145) 5, 6.
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stated that the current practice (involving talks between the
Council Presidency, the Commission and the chairs of the relevant
committees, and/or rapporteurs of the European Parliament, and
between co-chairs of the Conciliation Committee) “has proved its
worth”296 and must “be encouraged.”297 General principle no. 7
states that
Cooperation between the institutions in the context of codecision
often takes the form of tripartite meetings (‘trilogues’). This trilogue
system has demonstrated its vitality and flexibility in increasing
significantly the possibilities for agreement at first and second
reading stages, as well as contributing to the preparation of the work
of the Conciliation Committee.298

The Declaration confirms that such trilogues are usually
conducted in an informal framework but then it tries to make them
more formal, introducing some general rules related to any stage of
the ordinary legislative procedure where the trilogues may be
held.299 It is noteworthy that they have been subject to increasing
degrees of formalization, leading to binding norms over time. 300
296. Id. at General Principles n. 1.
297. Id. at General Principles n. 2.
298. Id. at General Principles n. 7.
299. Id. at Part II (Information).
300. Christilla Roederer-Rynning & Justin Greenwood, The Culture of
Trilogues, 22 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1148, 1149-50 (2015). The authors point out,
A first attempt to regulate the procedure took place in 2004 with the
adoption of non-binding EP Guidelines for First and Second Reading
Agreements (European Parliament 2004), though to little avail.
Committees continued to display a patchwork of different practices, often
leaving rapporteurs considerable freedom to make deals. This raised
‘serious concerns … about the potential lack of transparency and
democratic legitimacy inherent in the first reading negotiations, but also
about the quality of the adopted legislation. In 2007, a Working Party for
Parliamentary Reform set up by the Conference of Presidents advocated
a more detailed set of rules. These were adopted as the EP’s Code of
Conduct in 2008 and annexed to the EP’s Rules of Procedure (RoP) in
2009 (European Parliament 2008). However, the code did little to ease
the tide of criticism owing to its lack of binding status. In 2011, the
Constitutional Affairs Committee, at the request of the Conference of
Presidents, drafted recommendations to give a legal status to the Code
provisions. This new wave of reform led to the revision of Rule 70 (now
73) of the RoP on ‘Interinstitutional negotiations in legislative
procedures,’, which incorporated key provisions of the Code into the
Rules and introduced the possibility of making the opening of trilogue
negotiations conditional upon a mandate delivered by the EP’s Plenary
(Rule 70a, now 74).
The 2011 revisions also involved specification of the composition of the
EP negotiating team and their obligations for reporting back during the
course of trilogue negotiations. The chair or designated vice-chair
nominee and the shadow rapporteurs and/or political group coordinators
(or designated alternative) of the lead committee became de jure
members of the EP negotiating team besides the rapporteur. Negotiators
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Since their first appearance, trilogues have developed in
practice from the need of the two branches of the legislature to
manage their interdependence.301 Such inter-institutional
negotiations have now become standard practice for the adoption of
EU legislative acts. In 2014, around ninety percent of EU laws were
passed at first reading of the ordinary legislative procedure,302 with
research by the Parliament estimating that the average law agreed
at first reading takes seventeen months from start to finish. 303
The EU Treaties already contain detailed rules governing the
conciliation procedure between the co-legislators.304 In the ordinary
legislative procedure, Article 294 of the TFEU inserted the so-called
conciliation procedure before the third reading of the decisionmaking process.305 The aim was precisely to find a solution when
the positions of the Parliament and the Council had proved to be
irreconcilable in the first two readings. The Treaty of Lisbon has
therefore introduced into the community law a conciliation
procedure that would allow a joint solution to be reached to
overcome the paralysis determined by the opposing and
irreconcilable positions of the main bodies of the European Union.306
A conciliation committee, composed of an equal number of
members of the Parliament and Council representatives, is
convened if the Council does not approve all of the Parliament's
amendments at the second reading.307 If the committee does not
agree on a joint text, the legislative act is not adopted, and the
are required to report back to the Committee after each trilogue meeting,
with opportunities to report back to their political group, for the renewal
of a mandate. Meanwhile, the political groups themselves also observe
the trilogue negotiations directly. Where there is no scheduled meeting
of the Committee to report back to, the Committee chair is required to
convene a meeting of the designated political coordinators within each
committee.
Id.
301. See id. (developing a whole picture on cultural institutionalization of
trilogues).
302. Gianni Pittella et al., Activity Report on Codecision and Conciliation:
7th parliamentary term 14 July 2009-30 June 2014 (7th Parliamentary Term),
www.epgencms.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/upload/859059d1-8a65-4f20-a17a6c2baa7984aa/activity_report_2009_2014_en.pdf (last accessed May 23, 2019).
[hereinafter 14 July 2009 Activity Report].
303. Id. That trend is confirmed by EU Vice-Presidents responsible for
Conciliation. Activity Report on the Ordinary Legislative Procedure 4 July 201431 December 2016 (8th parliamentary term), DV\111217EN, www.epgencms.
europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/upload/7c368f56-983b-431e-a9fa-643d609f86b8/
Activity-report-ordinary-legislative-procedure-2014-2016-en.pdf.
304. TFEU, supra note 112, at art. 294, ¶ 10-12.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at ¶ 10. See also European Parliament, Rules of Procedure, 8th
Parliamentary term, January 2017, Section 3, Interinstitutional negotiations
during the ordinary legislative procedure where negotiations are specifically
provided in different stages of the ordinary legislative procedure.
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procedure is ended.308 If a joint text is agreed, that text is forwarded
to the Parliament and the Council for a third reading, and the
wording of the joined text cannot be changed by the two
institutions.309
The codecision procedure became the ‘ordinary legislative
procedure’ of the EU with the Treaty of Lisbon and has been the
subject of a number of adaptations during its relatively short
history.310 The formal process by which agreement is reached has
proved to be, however, complex and time-consuming. It involves,
potentially, multiple stages of deliberations and votes. Formal
meetings between the co-legislators (carried out in a “Conciliation
Committee”) can occur, but only after the second reading, at the
very end of the process.311 This can make for a lengthy and difficult
process.
In the post-Lisbon Treaty era, in which lawmakers are actively
encouraged to go faster in agreeing on legislation, the conciliation
process has been almost eliminated in recent years.312 In the 19992004 term, eighty-nine of the four hundred EU legislative acts were
completed after conciliation.313 In the first half of the current term,
the figure was down to zero because there have been no conciliation
procedures yet.314 This is the first time it has been zero since the
Treaty of Maastricht and it is “one of the most distinctive legislative
features of the current parliamentary term so far, it is not wholly
unexpected, given the trend over recent years towards more early
agreements between the co-legislators.”315
Despite the conciliation procedure, trilogues enable the colegislators to reach agreement at any stage of the legislative
procedure, once the Commission has presented a proposal, even
with no express reference in the EU Treaties. 316 If the negotiations
are successful, a compromise text is presented to the plenary of

308. TFEU, supra note 112, at art. 294, ¶ 12.
309. Id. at ¶ 13.
310. See CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 116, at 123 (explaining that the codecision procedure led to “[t]he most significant increase in the power of the
EP”).
311. TFEU, supra note 112, at art. 294, ¶ 10.
312. See generally Antonio Tajani et al., Activity Report on the Ordinary
Legislative Procedure 4 July 2014-31 December 2016 (8th Parliamentary Term),
www.epgencms.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/upload/7c368f56-983b-431e-a9fa643d609f86b8/Activity-report-ordinary-legislative-procedure-2014-2016-en.pdf
(last accessed May 23, 2019) (pointing out the lack of conciliation during the
period of the report).
313. Pittella et al., supra note 302.
314. Tajani et al., supra note 312, at Foreword.
315. Id.
316. See European Parliament, Rules of Procedure, 8th Parliamentary term,
January 2017, Section 3, Interinstitutional negotiations during the ordinary
legislative procedure [hereinafter Parliament Rules of Procedure] (setting forth
where negotiations are specifically provided in different stages of the ordinary
legislative procedure).
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Parliament and the Council.317 If each co-legislator formally
approves the compromise text, it becomes law. 318
According to Reh, trilogues differ from the EU’s formal
legislative procedure mainly in four ways. 319 “First, membership in
trilogues is restricted and non-codified. […] Trilogues involve a
limited group of actors, and the boundaries of participation are
neither codified nor publicly known.”320 People attending trilogues
may vary from file to file. Each institution designates its negotiators
and defines its negotiating mandate.321 Trilogues may be organized
at any stage of the legislative procedure (first, second or third
reading) and any provisional agreement reached in trilogues is
informal and has therefore to be approved by the formal procedures
applicable within each of the two institutions. 322
The Parliament reformed its Rules of Procedure in 2017,
introducing Section 3, entitled Interinstitutional negotiations
during the ordinary legislative procedure, where general rules on
negotiations at any stage of the ordinary legislative procedure were
provided.323 In the Parliament, for example, Rule 69f(1) states that
“Parliament's negotiating team shall be led by the rapporteur and
shall be presided over by the Chair of the committee responsible or
by a Vice-Chair designated by the Chair. It shall at least consist of
the shadow rapporteurs from each political group that wishes to
participate.”324 The trilogue’s format, however, remains the same:
together with Parliament’s negotiation team, “around the table are
officials from the European Commission and either the minister or
senior civil servants from the country holding the EU Council
presidency.”325
“Second, trilogues are secluded, and their seclusion has neither
been formally decided nor publicly justified. Access is highly
restrictive and information on the decision-process is limited to
feedback given by negotiators to their respective committees, and
documentation on the decision-process is not publicly available.” 326
317. See European Parliament, Ordinary Legislative Procedure Interinstitutional negotiations for the adoption of EU Legislation,
www.europarl.europa.eu/ordinary-legislative-procedure/en/interinstitutionalnegotiations.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2019) [hereinafter Ordinary Legislative
Procedure] (outlining the approval process for the compromise text).
318. Id.
319. Christine Reh, Is Informal Politics Undemocratic? Trilogues, Early
Agreements and the Selection Model of Representation, 21 J. EUR. PUBL POL’Y
822, 825 (2014).
320. Id.
321. Id. at 828.
322. Ordinary Legislative Procedure, supra note 317.
323. European Parliament, Rules of Procedure, 8th Parliamentary term,
January 2017.
324. Id. at rule 69f(1).
325. Benjamin Fox, Secret EU Lawmaking: The Triumph of the Trilogues,
EUOBSERVER (Apr. 4, 2014), euobserver.com/investigations/123555.
326. Reh, supra note 319, at 825.
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The participants are invariably armed with four-columned
documents representing the starting position of the three
institutions, with the fourth column left for the compromise text
that is meant to emerge.327 According to Parliament’s Rules of
Procedure, “[a]ny document intended to be discussed at a meeting
with the Council and the Commission (‘trilogue’) shall be circulated
to the negotiating team at least 48 hours or, in cases of urgency, at
least 24 hours in advance of that trilogue.”328 The Parliament’s
Rules of Procedure also state,
After each trilogue, the Chair of the negotiating team and the
rapporteur shall, on behalf of the negotiating team, report back to the
next meeting of the committee responsible. Where it is not feasible to
convene a meeting of the committee in a timely manner, the Chair of
the negotiating team and the rapporteur shall, on behalf of the
negotiating team, report back to a meeting of the committee
coordinators.329

“Third, the rules specifying what is ‘requested, prohibited, or
permitted’ in trilogues are informal; as such, they are ‘created,
communicated and enforced outside the officially sanctioned
channels.”330 Specifically, Parliament’s Rule 69f(4) reads,
If negotiations lead to a provisional agreement, the committee
responsible shall be informed without delay. Documents reflecting
the outcome of the concluding trilogue shall be made available to the
committee responsible and shall be published. The provisional
agreement shall be submitted to the committee responsible, which
shall decide, by way of a single vote by a majority of the votes cast,
whether to approve it. If approved, it shall be tabled for consideration
by Parliament, in a presentation which clearly indicates the
modifications to the draft legislative act.331

Since former Rule 70 (2013) generally stated that “documents
reflecting the outcome of the last trilogue shall be made available to
the committee,” one may pay attention on how much room has been
taken away from the informality of the whole process, at least at the
Parliament’s ground.332
“Finally, the political process cannot be concluded in the
informal arena; any agreement reached in trilogue is intermediate

327. Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood, supra note 300, at 1158.
328. Parliament Rules of Procedure, supra note 316, at Rule 69f(2).
329. Id. at Rule 69f(3).
330. Reh, supra note 319, at 825 (quoting Elinor Ostrom, An Agenda for the
Study of Institutions, 48 PUB. CHOICE 3 (1986)); Gretchen Helmke & Steven
Levitsky, Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda,
2 PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 725 (2004).
331. Parliament Rules of Procedure, supra note 316, at Rule 69f(4).
332. European Parliament, Amendment of Rule 70 on interinstitutional
negotiations in legislative, Rule 70(2b) (Nov. 20, 2012), www.europarl.europa.eu
/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-20120422+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.
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until formalized by the EP’s plenary and a Council meeting.”333
There is a clear benefit to reaching an early deal. This avoids
the legislative proposal going back around the Parliament and
Council for a second or even a third reading, which can add years to
the decision-making process.
However, trilogues are problematic from a democratic
perspective: they are secluded; involve a restricted number of
participants selected according to unclear criteria; and produce
intermediary outcomes that have to be sanctioned by formal
decision-making processes. Scholars and professionals have
inquired if trilogues weaken the democracy and transparency of the
EU law-making procedure and, definitely, of the EU action. 334
The core issue is about the democratic accountability of
trilogues. As the EU Ombudsman pointed out:
In a representative democracy, citizens elect representatives to act on
their behalf in decision-making processes, most importantly, in the
process of making laws. Citizens then hold their representatives to
account for how they perform, most notably at elections. This applies
equally to Members of the European Parliament […] and to Member
States’ Ministers (who can be held to account through national
elections or via their national Parliaments). […] The legislative
process in a representative democracy therefore requires, if the
representative democracy is to function properly, a high level of
transparency.335

According to that, European citizens, businesses, and
organizations should be able to follow each stage of the law-making
procedure and to understand how the negotiators arrive at the
endpoint, because the Treaties provide for legislating as openly as
possible to maintain public trust.
In 2015 such critical issues went under the attention of the
European Ombudsman, who opened an investigation focused on the
right balance between the public interest in transparency and the
public interest in an effective and efficient legislative process. 336 As
333. Reh, supra note 319, at 826.
334. Hans-Joachim Lauth, Informal Governance and Democratic Theory, in
INT’L HANDBOOK ON INFORMAL GOVERNANCE, 40-64 (Thomas Christiansen &
Christine Neuhold, eds. 2012); Anne Rasmussen & Christine Reh, The
Consequences of Concluding Codecision Early: Trilogues and Intra Institutional
Bargaining Success, 20 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1006-24 (2013); Reh, supra note 319,
at 837 (2014); Christopher Lord, The Democratic Legitimacy of Codecision, 20
JUR. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1056-73 (2013); ANNE ELIZABETH STIE, DEMOCRATIC
DECISION-MAKING IN THE EU, TECHNOCRACY IN DISGUISE? (Routledge 2013).
335. European Ombudsmen, Decision of the European Ombudsman setting
out proposals following her strategic inquiry OI/8/2015/JAS concerning the
transparency of Trilogues ¶¶ 15-16 (Jul. 12, 2016), www.ombudsm an.europa.eu
/en/decision/en/69206 [hereinafter OI/8/2015/JAS]; see also Sweden and Turco v
Council, joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P, ¶ 46 (stating the ability of EU
citizens “to find out the considerations underpinning legislative action is a
precondition for the effective exercise of their democratic rights”).
336. OI/8/2015/JAS, supra note 335, at ¶ 68.
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a result, the Ombudsman identified three core issues institutions
have to face for making trilogues more respondent to the democratic
principle. They are all related to the transparency of trilogues that
arise for citizens: “citizens need to know if trilogue negotiations are
taking place on a legislative proposal; they need general
information about the content of those negotiations; and they need
to know who is taking part in the negotiations.” 337
The Ombudsman made also a list of her own proposals to
Parliament, Council, and Commission to solve the critical issues of
the trilogue agreements,338 generally based on an improved
circulation of information about trilogues agenda and participants,
along with a wider document availability.339

D. Trilogues and the Separation of Powers in the EU
It would be of great interest to investigate if an actual
separation of powers is really provided in the EU legal context,
whether in the Treaties or in the daily practice of the EU. Also, it
would be worth inquiring whether trilogues exist because there is
separation of powers or, by contrast, because that separation is not
part of the very nature of EU legal system. 340
What seems more relevant for the purpose of this article,
however, is how trilogues are shaping the institutional
relationships between the Parliament, the Council, and the
Commission. Since trilogues appeared, it is indeed possible to see
337. Id. at ¶ 32.
338. It is worth noting that the EU institutions presented a united front
against the Ombudsman, challenging the admissibility of her inquiry. They
argued that the organizational aspects of the legislative procedure fall outside
of her mandate because the way these meetings are organized pertain to the
Council’s and the Parliament’s political responsibilities as the EU co-legislators,
and not to their administrative activity.
339. OI/8/2015/JAS, supra note 335 (proposing that the institutions: “[1)]
make proactively available, before trilogue negotiations begin, their positions
on the Commission proposal; [2)] make available general summary agendas
before or shortly after trilogue meetings; [3)] make proactively available fourcolumn documents, including the final agreed text, as soon as possible after the
negotiations have been concluded; [4)] include, in legislative databases and
calendars covering trilogues, links to any minutes or videos of the institutions’
public meetings where a trilogue has been discussed; [5)] make proactively
available a list of the representatives who are politically responsible for
decisions taken during a Trilogue, such as the MEPs involved, the responsible
Minister from the Council Presidency and the Commissioner in charge of the
file. If the power to take decisions is delegated to civil servants, their identities
should also be disclosed proactively; [6)] make available as far as possible lists
of documents tabled during trilogue negotiations; [7)] to work together to make
as much trilogue information and documentation as possible publicly available
through an easy-to-use and easy-to-understand joint database”).
340. Those relevant issues are worthy to be deeply analyzed in the wider
joint research program with the Center for International Law at the UIC John
Marshall Law School mentioned at footnote n. 1.
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an evolution of the roles respectively played by the three
institutions in the legislative process.
Some believe that trilogues have been upgraded to the rank of
institutionalized tools, because they “have moved away from being
simple technical devices for managing the interdependence of the
co-legislators, to become cultural constructs crystallizing different
conceptions of institutional design” of the EU institutions. 341
Institutionalization of trilogues brought some critical changes.
On the one hand, it resulted in a classification of different kind of
trilogue meetings; on the other, it significantly changed the
Parliament’s and Council’s weighted powers in the legislative
procedure.342
Trilogues originally emerged as a means to facilitate the
‘conciliation procedure’ envisioned in the Maastricht Treaty (1992),
which obliged the Council and Parliament to meet (subject to strict
institutional requirements) in order to reach an agreement.343
The Council soon learned the new realities of being a colegislator, in that Parliament would veto any attempt by the
Council to reintroduce its common position. 344 The Council
understood that legislative efficiency under codecision required
early inter-institutional confidence-building measures.345 As
Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood observe “[s]ince the early days of
codecision, trilogues have become the way of making EU laws after
the Amsterdam Treaty (1999) making it possible for EU legislation
to be passed at first reading, [...] thereby extending their use beyond
that of the very conciliation procedure.”346
In the beginning of trilogues era, the Council seemed to play a
stronger role during informal negotiation phases. 347 Its superior
organization adaptation, the chance to get much more information,
and the expertise of national administrations made it easy for the
Council to play a very influential role in early trilogues.348 The
Parliament was instead a weaker player, having a marginal role in
the informal – as in the formal – legislative process.349
341. Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood, supra note 300, at 1153.
342. See TFEU, supra note 112, at art. 294-295 (setting forth the change of
power dynamics for both Parliament and the Council).
343. TEU, supra note 94, at art. 189b.
344. Michael Shackleton, The Politics of Codecision, 38 J. OF COMMON MKT.
STUD. 325-342 (2000).
345. Id.
346. Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood, supra note 300, at 1149.
347. Maja Kluger Dionigi & Christel Koop, Investigation of Informal
Trilogue Negotiations Since the Lisbon Treaty-Added Value, Lack of
Transparency and Possible Democratic Deficit, EUROPEAN ECON. & SOC.
COMMITTEE 54 (July 2017), www.eesc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/files/qe-0117-783-en-n.pdf.
348. See Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood, supra note 300, at 1160-1161
(concluding that Council gained a more powerful role in the trilogues, when
compared to Parliament).
349. Reh, supra note 319, at 835.
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By contrast, a more structured shaping of trilogues follows.
Trilogues are actually made of three different kind of meetings:
bilateral meetings, technical trilogues and political trilogues. 350
They all begin after the Commission has made its proposal. 351
Bilateral meetings work as the first and interlocutory place to
check if there is any ground of general and potential agreement
between the Council Presidency and the Parliament’s
representatives, and their respective technical assistants, over the
Commission’s proposal.352 Technical and political trilogues then
begin and meetings are run with a rigid separation between
technical and political sessions.353 No politicians are admitted in the
technical trilogues, however assistants and counselors are allowed
in political trilogues.354 Institutions do not want it to be possible for
a technical meeting to become hybrid unless explicitly agreed. 355
Several rounds of sessions may be necessary to draft a compromise
text.
Some logistical aspects could be useful to deeply understand
how trilogues have changed traditional roles in the law-making
procedure.
All political trilogues are held in the Parliament facilities and
they are presided by Parliament’s committee chairs involved
depending on the topic at stage.356 The trilogues Presidency decides
about meetings’ convening and duration and keeps the fourthcolumn document updated.357 Institutions’ delegations are not
evenly constituted. The Parliament normally has the biggest
representation (about thirty people, made up of politicians and
staff), while the Council has the smallest (usually one to three
people from the Presidency staff). 358 The Commission’s delegation is
made up of about eight to twelve people (and always at the highest
level of hierarchy).359
As Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood find,
Whilst formal rules of the game place Parliament at a disadvantage
viz. the Council (the higher threshold for a majority in second reading,
etc.), Parliament has acquired leverage over Council through the
routines established by the CCC or its secretariat on a crosscommittee basis, dominance of logistical arrangements in trilogues,

350. See Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood, supra note 300, at 1153
(contextualizing the three different types of meetings that make up trilogues).
351. Id.
352. TEU, supra note 94, at art. 17; TFEU, supra note 112, at art. 234, 24450, 290-91.
353. Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood, supra note 300, at 1153
354. Id. at 1157.
355. Id.
356. Dionigi & Koop, supra note 347, at 55.
357. Id. at 52.
358. Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood, supra note 300, at 1154.
359. Id. at 1155
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and the advantage conferred by numbers in full political trilogues.360

Parliament’s delegation is bigger361 and used to driving
political-based discussion: the size of the group matters and “the
enlargement of the group favors the transitions of its norms to the
form of law.”362

E. Criticizing Trilogues: The Widening of the
Democratic Deficit of EU Institutions
Trilogues are a successful strategy that discharge a potentially
cumbersome procedure, reduce transaction costs, and increase the
speed of decision-making. They make EU legislation more efficient
and promote interinstitutional co-operation.363
Yet, some scholars maintain that whereas the efficiency of
these meetings is undeniable, the necessary balance between costtime efficiencies and the principles of accountability, transparency
and public participation remains to be determined.364
Critics of trilogues have focused on three major democratic
challenges. First, the way the co-legislators come to decisions is
undocumented and thus there is a lack of transparency of the
legislative process365 and where Parliament and Council collude,
they weaken public and minority control through mutual checks
and balances taking the debate into secluded places of
negotiation.366
360. Id. at 1159.
361. GEORG SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 87 (Kurt H. Wolff,
trans., The Free Press 1950).
It will immediately be conceded on the basis of everyday experiences,
that a group upon reaching a certain size must develop forms and organs
which serve its maintenance and promotion, but which a smaller group
does not need. On the other hand, it will also be admitted that smaller
groups have qualities, including types of interaction among their
members, which inevitably disappear when the groups grow larger.
Id.
362. Id. at 103.
363. The codecision statistics support this view: more than 1,000 legislative
acts have been passed since 1999; in the first half of the 2009-2014 EP, a first
reading dossier took on average merely 14.4 months to conclude, and only 4
percent of files went up to conciliation. European Parliament, Delegations to
the Conciliation Committee, Activity Report 14 July 2009–31 December 2011,
2012, 4-6.
364. Rasmussen & Reh, supra note 334, at 1007-1008.
365. Renzo Imbeni et al., Improving the Functioning of the Codecision
Procedure, 2 (2001); Tony Bunyan, Secret Trilogues and the Democratic Deficit,
7 (2007); Christine Reh, Informal Politics: The Normative Challenge, in INT’L
HANDBOOK ON INFORMAL GOVERNANCE, 65-84 (Thomas Christiansen &
Christine Neuhold, eds. 2012); Reh, supra note 319, at 826; STIE, supra note
334.
366. Christopher Lord, The Democratic Legitimacy of Codecision, 20 JUR.
EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1059-63 (2013).
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In addition, those authors have highlighted the constraints on
political inclusion, public justification, and parliamentary
deliberation where “debate in the plenary with the full participation
of all political groups and members” is “reduced in importance by
informal negotiations taking place elsewhere,” which reduce access
opportunities for wider political debate.367
Finally, trilogues would differentiate access to, and control
over, decision-making, while seclusion would reduce access to
information. Such differentiations disproportionately empower big
political parties (and their rapporteurs in particular) as well as big
Member States (and their Presidencies in particular) at the expense
of small political groups and rank-and-file parliamentarians.368
It is worth adding that trilogues have also raised the concerns
of a broad spectrum of civil society and EU citizens, whose right to
participate in the democratic life of the Union is being infringed. 369
Public discussion of legislative proposals is the essence of any
democratic decision-making process, they say.370 This is why EU
citizens must be directly involved during the legislative process and
be able to scrutinize the performance of their representatives, as the
Ombudsman argued.371 Most of the trilogue negotiations begin
before the Parliament has adopted its first reading position
officially, whereas the Council and the Parliament have already
agreed on the final text of the legislation. 372 As a result, the whole
debate shifts from the plenary to closed-door meetings where only
very few members of the Parliament take part. 373 This would
prevent an in-depth discussion of proposals by the elected
representatives.
Thus, trilogues profoundly undermine and weaken the position
of the only directly democratically-elected institution in the EU, the
European Parliament. Furthermore, it means that the public
cannot scrutinize the positions held in the course of the meetings by
the rapporteur and shadow rapporteur, the Commission, and the
367. Imbeni et al., supra note 365, at 2; Christopher Lord, The Democratic
Legitimacy of Codecision, 20 JUR. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1059-63 (2013); Anne
Elizabeth Stie, Democratic Decision-Making in the EU, Technology in Disguise?,
in TECHNOLOGIES IN DISGUISE? (1st ed. 2013).
368. Henry Farrell & Adrienne Héritier, The Invisible Transformation of
Codecision: Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, SIEPS Report No 7 (2003);
Henry Farrell & Adrienne Héritier, Interorganizational Cooperation and
Intraorganizational Power: Early Agreements under Codecision and Their
Impact on the Parliament and the Council, 37 COMPARATIVE POL. STUD. 37(10)
1184-1212 (2004).
369. Open Letter to Martin Schulz, President of European Parliament, JeanClaude Juncker, President of European Comm’n, Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen,
Secretary-General of the Council, & Emily O'Reilly, European Ombudsmen
(Sept. 30, 2015), edri.org/files/Transparency_LetterTrialogues_20150930.pdf.
370. Id.
371. OI/8/2015/JAS, supra note 335, at ¶ 20.
372. Id. at ¶ 43.
373. Dionigi & Koop, supra note 347, at 53-54.
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Member States within the Council.
The disclosure policy of trilogue-related documents is also
being contested. Contrary to the general rule of openness in
legislative activity, neither the position of the three institutions nor
the minutes of trilateral negotiations are disclosed to the public
while the legislative process is ongoing.374 This would prevent public
participation from taking place.
In its case-law regarding Article 4(2) of Regulation 1049/2001
on public access, the European Court of Justice since Turco stressed
that openness
enables citizens to participate more closely in the decision-making
process and guarantees that the administration enjoys greater
legitimacy and is more effective and more accountable to the citizen
in a democratic system. Those considerations are clearly of particular
relevance where the Council is acting in its legislative capacity [...].
Openness in that respect contributes to strengthening democracy by
allowing citizens to scrutinize all the information which has formed
the basis of a legislative act. The possibility for citizens to find out the
considerations underpinning legislative action is a precondition for
the effective exercise of their democratic rights.375

In the post-Lisbon era, ECJ case-law has emphasized the
formal division between legislative and non-legislative documents.
In legislative acts the openness principle applies according to
Article 15 TFEU376 thus in the ECJ case-law the right to access to
documents relating trilogues has become particularly topical. 377
In a nutshell, for critics of trilogues, openness and
transparency constitute the best means to overcome the “democratic
deficit” and to make the EU closer to citizens.

F. Advocating Trilogues: Efficiency, Democracy, and
Legitimacy
Starting from the famous Lincoln declination of democracy, 378
there have been three main normative criteria through which the
dimension of the democratic deficit that invests the European
374. OI/8/2015/JAS, supra note 335, at ¶¶ 56-57.
375. Grand Chamber, joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P., Kingdom of
Sweden and Maurizio Turco v. Council, 2008, ¶¶ 45-46.
376. TFEU, supra note 112 at art. 15 (stating “1. In order to promote good
governance and ensure the participation of civil society, the Union institutions,
bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as possible.
2. The European Parliament shall meet in public, as shall the Council when
considering and voting on a draft legislative act”).
377. Päivi Leino, Secrecy, Efficiency, Transparency in EU Negotiations:
Conflicting Paradigms?, 5 POL. & GOVERNANCE 6-15 (2017).
378. President Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address, in AM. HERITAGE
BOOK OF GREAT AM. SPEECHES 91-92 (Suzanne McIntire, ed. 2001) “[…] this
nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom and that government of
the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.” Id.
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institutions was measured in literature. On the one hand, output
effectiveness for the people; on the other hand, input participation
by (and of) the people.379
Those arguments have to be addressed to ensure that the
trilogues enhance democracy, legitimacy, and efficiency.
1. Do Trilogues Strengthen EU Efficiency?
The process of European integration has proceeded on the
presumption that the legitimacy of the EU emanates from its
capacity to deliver the wanted results. 380 In other words, one of the
strongest rationales to advocate legitimacy in EU institutions (and
actions) has been based on its effectiveness. As already argued
before in this article, it is widely known and acknowledged by both
scholars and professionals that trilogues enhance effectiveness.
Small delegations, with a strong legislative mandate by their
sending institutions, are more capable of finding early agreements.
If a compromise text is accomplished, it is more likely that it may
encounter the favor of people whom are going to be affected by it.381
Trilogues meet output legitimacy, strengthening the role of the EU
institutions, which are perceived as more effective and thus closer
to the needs of the people.382
In addition to the EU’s action efficiency, trilogues also reinforce
everything in between the inputs and outputs, which is referred to
as throughput legitimacy.383

379. Schmidt, supra note 122, at 4 (arguing “[t]he concepts of output and
input legitimacy as applied to the EU have their origins in the work of Scharpf
[F.W. SCHARPF, Demokratietheorie zwischen Utopie und Anpassung. Konstanz
1970], who delineated ‘output-oriented’ legitimization as centering on the
ability of EU institutions to govern effectively for the people and ‘input-oriented’
legitimization as involving political participation by the people”).
380.Karl-Oskar Lindgren & Thomas Persson, Input and Output Legitimacy:
Synergy or Trade-Off? Empirical Evidence From an EU Survey, 17 J. OF EUR.
PUB. POL’Y, 449, 450 (2010).
381. Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood, supra note 300, at 1149-50; 14 July
2009 Activity Report, supra note 302302, at 19, 43.
382. Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood, supra note 300, at 1149-50.
383. Schmidt, supra note 122, at 5,
‘Throughput’ legitimacy concentrates on what goes on inside the ‘black
box’ of EU governance, in the space between the political input and the
policy output, which has typically been left blank by political systems
theorists. It focuses on the quality of the governance processes of the EU
as contributing to a different kind of normative legitimacy from both the
performance-oriented legitimacy of output and the participationoriented legitimacy of input. Throughput is process-oriented, and based
on the interactions – institutional and constructive – of all actors
engaged in EU governance.
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2. Is Democracy Actually Affected by Trilogue Delegations’
Size, as Most Critics Affirm?
There are many arguments that can be used against that
assertion. First, such delegations are normally exploited in any
democratic system in order to find early agreements at any given
level where majority decisions have to be taken, well before those
decisions must formally be taken. Second, despite what happened
in early trilogues, Parliament’s delegations are now appointed
according to the Rules of Procedure as amended in 2017; along with
the Chair of the Committee responsible, the majority is also
represented in EP delegations as well as minority or any political
group which wish to participate in the informal negotiations. 384
Third, delegations receive a clear negotiating mandate during
plenary sessions and bilateral talks do not start before both
Parliament and Council mandates are in place. 385 Furthermore,
respective delegations cannot depart from the given mandates
during negotiations.386 The Council, as an institution participating
in trilogues, should be less affected by that kind of criticism because
the Council’s law-making process always used to be secret and not
transparent.387 However, the Council has traditionally conditioned
the opening of trilogue negotiations to the support of substantive
majority, elaborated through an open (although not public) process
allowing each national delegation to annotate a draft proposal
circulated by the Presidency and Secretariat.388
Fourth, any compromise text agreed during trilogues is then
subject to the final vote of the plenary in the Parliament and the
Council, according to general rules provided in the Treaties:
procedures, voting, and majority thresholds remain those of the
ordinary legislative procedure along with the guarantees thereof. 389
Moreover, all the procedural guarantees discussed in the first
part of this article, as an early warning system, have increased
involvement of national parliaments and regions. Further, ECJ
authority over subsidiarity and proportionality may be activated
immediately after the Commission has made its new legislative
proposal; therefore, well before the trilogues start. 390
Finally, scholars generally agree that the Parliament’s role in
the legislative process has improved since trilogues have been
institutionalized.391 Since the Parliament is the unique institution
384. Parliament Rules of Procedure, supra note 316, at Rule 69f(1).
385. Id. at Rules 69(c)-69(e).
386. Id. at Rules 69(d)-69(e).
387. See CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 116, at 41-46 (discussing the makeup and composition of the Council, along with its dynamics).
388. See Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood, supra note 300, at 1159-1160
(explaining the process by which the trilogues begin through open means).
389. TFEU, supra note 112, at art. 294.
390. Subsidiarity and Proportionality, supra note 125, at art. 8.
391. See Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood, supra note 300, at 1159 (pointing
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directly elected by the people, a Parliament-driven trilogue model
offers major guarantees in terms of democracy, legitimacy and
representation.
3. Does Legitimacy Really Depend on Openness and
Transparency?
As long as treaties and regulations provide for the general rule
of working as openly as possible, they also provide derogations and
exclusions as well. For example, Article 4(3) of Regulation
1049/2001 set a meaningful exception:
Access to a document, drawn up by an institution for internal use
or received by an institution, which relates to a matter where the
decision has not been taken by the institution, shall be refused if
disclosure of the document would seriously undermine the
institution’s decision-making process, unless there is an overriding
public interest in disclosure.392

Article 4(3) has been used irrespectively of the distinction
between legislative and non-legislative actions, which does not
reflect the realities of EU decision-making, where many procedures
do not fall clearly under either of these two categories. 393
The European Ombudsman has recently closed a strategic
inquiry concerning the proactive transparency of trilogues,
stressing their role as the forum where the deals are done. 394 The
issue at stake was the correct trade-off between transparency and
efficiency of trilogues: which information and documents could be
made available to the public, and when.395 Also, the Ombudsman
maintained that “[i]t is arguable that the interest in wellfunctioning trilogue negotiations temporarily outweighs the
interest in transparency for as long as the trilogue negotiations are
ongoing,”396 recommending, however, that the four-column
documents should be made proactively available as soon as possible
after the negotiations have been concluded.397
Finally, some recent Court cases398 on the neglected disclosure
out that “Parliament has acquired leverage over Council through the routines
established by the CCC or its secretariat on a cross-committee basis, dominance
of logistical arrangements in trilogues, and the advantage conferred by numbers
in full political trilogues”).
392. Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 30 May 2001 Regarding Public Access to European Parliament,
Council and Commission Documents, 2001 O.J., art. 4(3).
393. Case C-612/13 P, ClientEarth v. Commission, 2015; Case T-402/12,
Schlyter v. Commission, 2015 (confirmed by European Court of Justice (fourth
chamber) C-331/15 P, 2017).
394. OI/8/2015/JAS, supra note 335, at ¶¶ 4-5.
395. Id.
396. Id. at ¶ 54.
397. Id. at ¶ 56.
398. Herbert Smith Freehills LLP v. Commission (2016); Herbert Smith
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of documents relating to the trilogue stage of negotiations confirm
that the argument based on transparency is
necessary for the legislative process to be understood, constitutes
in itself a public interest that must be protected […], cannot
provide an appropriate basis for establishing that the principle of
transparency is of especially pressing concern and could thus
prevail over the reasons justifying the refusals to grant access to
the requested documents.399

The institution concerned has to weigh the particular interest
to be protected through non-disclosure and “[t]he exchanging of
legal views between the legal services of three institutions in order
to reach a compromise regarding a legislative text in the context of
a trilogue may, where appropriate, be described as legal advice and,
as a result, may fall under the exception relating to legal advice.” 400
Further, “[t]he legal services act under a mandate and with the aim
of reaching an agreement.”401 “They thus simultaneously act as
negotiators and advisers with regard to legal matters.” 402 It is worth
noting that the concept of ‘legal advice’ is not defined in Regulation
No 1049/2001 and it is apparent from the case-law in Turco that the
concept of ‘legal advice’ relates to the content of a document and not
to its author or its addressees.403
As is apparent from a literal interpretation of the words ‘legal
advice’, this is a question of advice relating to a legal issue,
regardless of the way in which that advice is given. In other words,
it is irrelevant, for the purposes of applying the exception relating
to the protection of legal advice, whether the document containing
that advice was provided at an early, late or final stage of the
decision-making process. In the same way, the fact of the advice
having been given in a formal or informal context has no effect on
the interpretation of those words.404

The most recent jurisprudence of the Court, therefore,
definitely supports arguments in favor of trilogues, not only over
their valuable contribution to the efficiency of the EU law-making
process, but even over the sustainable trade-off between their
legitimacy and democracy shape over critics’ openness and
transparency claims.

Freehills LLP v. Council (2016); Philip Morris Ltd v. Commission (2016). The
pending case T-540/15 De Capitani v. European Parliament, 2015 concerns
especially the four-column documents used as a basis for trilogues and will be
delivered (supposedly) in March 22 2018.
399. Case T-710/14, Herbert Smith Freehills LLP v. Council (2016), ¶ 72
[hereinafter Case T-710/14].
400. Id. at ¶ 59.
401. Id. at ¶ 60.
402. Id. at ¶ 60.
403. Sweden and Turco v. Council, joined cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P,
cit., ¶¶ 38-39.
404. Case T-710/14, supra note 399, at ¶ 48.
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IV. THE ENVIRONMENT AND REGULATION WITHIN THE
UNITED STATES
A. The Current Context
Four years after President Obama announced that the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) would design a
regulatory strategy to reduce carbon emissions, in what would form
the basis of the Clean Power Plan,405 President Trump announced
his intention to eliminate American involvement in the Paris
Agreement.406 The resulting change in American policy has been
dramatic. The rollbacks began almost immediately.
Within four months of inauguration, for example, changes were
made to eliminate protection for streams, fuel efficiency regulations
had been called into question, a basic re-write of the Clean Power
Plan had been ordered, and requirements forbidding the dumping
of toxic chemicals had been altered.407 The results were the largest
rollback in such a limited time-frame in the EPA’s history.408 By
December 2018, according to The New York Times, seventy-eight
environmental rules had either been eliminated since Trump
became president or were on their way to elimination, covering such
areas as air pollution and emissions, water pollution, and drilling
and extraction.409
405. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R 60).
406. Trump stated:
Therefore, in order to fulfill my solemn duty to protect America and its
citizens, the United States will withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord
— (applause) — thank you, thank you – but begin negotiations to reenter
either the Paris Accord or a really entirely new transaction on terms that
are fair to the United States, its businesses, its workers, its people, its
taxpayers. So we’re getting out. But we will start to negotiate, and we
will see if we can make a deal that’s fair. And if we can, that’s great. And
if we can’t, that’s fine.
President Donald J. Trump, Statement on the Paris Climate Accord (June 1,
2017), perma.cc/6GZ7-GJXP.
407. Juliet Eilperin & Darla Cameron, How Trump is Rolling Back Obama’s
Legacy,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
20,
2018),
www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-rolling-back-obamarules/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.bab12161ea44; see also Lisa Friedman &
Brad Plumer, E.P.A. Drafts Rule on Coal Plants to Replace Clean Power Plan,
N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/climate/clean-powerplan-replacement.html (describing Trump Administration’s drafting of far less
stringent rules to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from coal-fired power
plants).
408. James L. Gattuso, Trump’s Red Tape Rollback, HERITAGE FOUND. (Dec.
12, 2017), www.heritage.org/government-regulation/commentary/trumps-redtape-rollback.
409. Nadja Popovich, Livia Albeck-Ripka & Kendra Pierre-Louis, 78
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As the American federal government systematically began
eliminating the methodologies designed to ensure American
compliance with the Paris Agreement, other parties – state
governments, municipal governments, private enterprises – began
to step forth and assert their role in combatting climate change. 410
Climate change is global, and it involves basic questions of
international relations, traditionally the realm of the federal
government. As non-federal actors have increasingly asserted
themselves, basic questions of federalism in the environmental
context have increasingly arisen. 411 One issue is the question of
preemption, that is whether federal climate change legislation (or
lack thereof) should preempt state and local laws. 412 Thus Part IV
of this article first provides a brief overview of federalism concepts
in the United States, second examines the role of environmental
protection within the federalism debate, and finally examines some
of the non-federal responses to the need for action related to climate
change.

B. American Federalism and the Environment
The issue of federalism in the United States is complex. While
there is a host of regulations at each of the federal, state, and local
levels, the interplay between them is not always clear. In the United
States, the federal government’s power is enumerated in the
Constitution, and it can only exercise those powers granted to it. 413
While the United States Constitution provides the federal
government with numerous exclusive powers, such as dealing with
foreign relations, the military, trade across national and state
Environmental Rules on the Way Out Under Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2018),
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/05/climate/trump-environment-rulesreversed.html.
410. Hiroko Tabuchi & Henry Fountain, Bucking Trump, These Cities,
States and Companies Commit to Paris Accord, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017),
www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/american-cities-climate-standards.html.
411. This topic has been debated for some time. See, e.g., Judith Resnik et
al., Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and
Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAs), 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 709
(2008) (discussing Translocal Organizations of Government Actors); Benjamin
K. Sovacool & Marilyn A. Brown, Scaling the Policy Response to Climate
Change, 27 POL’Y & SOC’Y 317 (2009) (reviewing strategies for addressing
climate change and noting the importance of state and global action); David M
Konisky & Neal D. Woods, Exporting Air Pollution? Regulatory Enforcement
and Environmental Free Riding in the United States, 63 POL. RES. Q. 771 (2010)
(questioning the Clean Air Act and free-riding behavior).
412. See, e.g., Jared Snyder & Jonathan Binder, The Changing Climate of
Cooperative Federalism: The Dynamic Role of the States in a National Strategy
to Combat Climate Change, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 231, 236 (2009)
(describing preemption and the importance of states in combatting climate
change).
413. RANDY E. BARNETT & JOSH BLACKMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES
IN CONTEXT 307 (3d ed. 2017) (citations omitted).

316

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[52:257

borders, and the monetary system, 414 other powers exist concurrent
with the states, such as regulating elections, taxing, borrowing
money, and establishing a system of courts. 415 Finally, the federal
government is given implied powers that are “necessary and proper”
to allow it to execute its enumerated powers.416
Among those powers granted to the federal government is the
power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” 417 In addition to
regulating interstate commerce, Congress may also “lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States.”418 That is, Congress may tax and spend. The power to tax
gives the government an element of control over activities it cannot
directly regulate. Further, the power to spend means that funding
may come only with conditions attached.419 And of course, the extent
of the government’s powers is broader than those enumerated, as
the Constitution authorizes Congress to “make all Laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers.”420
The States are not limited by enumerated powers. Their
powers arise elsewhere. The powers of states were not clearly
delineated until 1791 with the passage of the 10 th Amendment,
which states that “powers not delegated to the United States … nor
prohibited by [the Constitution] to the States, are reserved to the
States … or to the people.”421 Thus, the states can and do perform
many of the vital functions of modern government through the
police power,422 including criminal laws, running local public
schools, and zoning.
The issue of the interplay between the overlapping area of
regulatory competency is the question at the heart of federalism. At
its most basic, federalism is the allocation of powers and
responsibilities among the national, state, and local governmental
powers.423 While all levels of government participate in the
governing process, each operates independent of the others to some
degree. America has a system of dual sovereignty, where sovereign
power is recognized both in the individual states and in the federal
government.424 Federalism deals with the question of which level of
414. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 10.
415. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
416. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
417. Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
418. Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
419. BARNETT & BLACKMAN, supra note 413, at 308 (citations omitted).
420. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
421. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
422. BARNETT & BLACKMAN, supra note 413, at 307-08 (citations omitted).
423. William W. Buzbee, Federalism Hedging, Entrenchment, and the
Climate Challenge, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 1037, 1047 (2017).
424. 4 UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES AND COMMENTS § 28.08
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government can deal with regulatory issues, and its framework is
directly integrated into the United States Constitution.
American federalism is designed to achieve a number of core
values of good governance. These include maintaining checks and
balances of power to protect individuals, preserving governmental
accountability and transparency, maintaining local autonomy to
enable innovation and competition and to protect local interests,
keeping a centralized authority to address collective action issues,
and maintaining the benefits in problem solving offered by the joint
action of local and federal governments.425
But federalism issues are complicated in the area of the
environment. There are both practical and legal impediments to
state and local regulations related to climate change in the United
States. Climate change is global in nature, not local. Global
warming and greenhouse gas emissions are felt everywhere, as are
changes in the sea level and sea temperatures and countless other
atmospheric concerns.426 As a practical matter, these climaterelated issues have international repercussions well beyond the
scope and scale of what is typically addressed through state or
municipal legislation. As noted, the Constitution charges the
federal government, rather than the states and localities, with
managing international relations. 427 A clear benefit of delegating
this to the federal government, is presumably the creation of a
unified national position. This is done without the concern that
state or municipal action could lead to policies that are at odds with
those of the federal government. Climate change is obviously a
global problem that will ultimately require concerted international
action, but what this means as to the authority and ability of local
actors to engage in proactive action to combat climate change is a
different question.
Thus, a critical question in relation to American federalism is
the question of preemption. The Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution makes clear that the United States Constitution and
laws and treaties made pursuant to it are the supreme law of the

(2018). And of course, in addition to this duality, municipalities, counties, and
other local forms of government may also assert regulatory rights. See, e.g., Hari
M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change: Implications for the
Obama Administration, 62 ALA. L. REV. 237, 280, 284 (2011) (describing role of
non-state or federal governments); Judith Resnik, Lessons in Federalism from
the 1960s Class Action Rule and the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act: “The
Political Safeguards” of Aggregate Translocal Actions, 156 U. PENN. L. REV.
1929, 1931-32 (2008) (discussing the role of local actors in federalism dilemmas).
425. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Evolving Understandings of American
Federalism: Some Shifting Parameters, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 635 (2006)
(discussing the evolving values of federalism).
426. Sumudu Atapattu, Climate Change: Disappearing States, Migration,
and Challenges for International Law, 4 WASH. ENVTL. L. POL’Y. 1, 2-3 (2014).
427. U.S. CONST. art. I, cl. 8, 10, art. II, cl. 2.
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land.428 Yet, despite the breadth of the Constitutional mandate,
most legal areas are governed concurrently by federal and state
law.429 The question thus is when preemption would be appropriate
in the environmental context and when it serves to defeat the core
values federalism is designed to achieve. Much of the argument for
preemption stems from the enormous economic importance of
maintaining a single national economy. Preemption on this ground
is usually linked to the Commerce Clause, and it too could have
major implications for state programs.430 In theory, state climate
change initiatives could impede national markets via the
implementation of local regulations. 431
Yet, in the area of climate change, even before the past few
years when the federal government has either failed to act or has
acted to de-regulate the environment, state and local governments
have been proactive. For example, regulation of environmental
injury to specific lands is done through local legislation. 432 In fact,
every American state has enacted legislation to address climate
change.433 California has lead the way, with legislation aimed,
among other areas, at reducing greenhouse emissions from
automobiles and electrical generators.434 Given both global and local
concerns, a dual approach seems desirable. Yet when the national
and the local approaches to environmental control diverge,
federalism issues rise to the forefront. These issues are not new to
the Supreme Court, which has addressed federalism concerns in
numerous contexts related to the environment.435

428. Id. at art. VI, cl. 2.
429. Josh Blackman, State Judicial Sovereignty, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 2033,
2038 (2016).
430. See Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism and the
Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 879 (2008) (discussing, inter alia, the Dormant
Commerce Clause as it relates to State climate activity and preemption
doctrine).
431. Carol M. Rose, Federalism and Climate Change: The Role of the States
in a Future Federal Regime—An Introduction, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 673, 676 (2008).
432. Land Use, ENVTL. LAW INST., www.eli.org/keywords/land-use (last
visited Aug. 20, 2019).
433. State Climate Policy Maps, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS,
www.c2es.org/content/state-climate-policy/; 5 Treatise on Environmental Law §
10.03 (2018).
434. Editorial Board, California Shows How States Can Lead on Climate
Change, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2017), www.nytimes.com/2017/07/24/
opinion/california-climate-change-cap-trade.html.
435. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452
U.S. 264, 324 (1981) (discussing mining); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 149 (1992) (addressing nuclear waste); Solid Waste Agency of Northern
Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC), 531 U.S.
159, 173-74 (2001) (discussing water pollution); Rapanos v. United States, 547
U.S. 715, 739 (2006) (addressing water pollution); Massachusetts v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 534, 537 (2007) (discussing
climate change and raising the question of whether environmental protection is
the primary prerogative of the state or federal government).
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Special problems arise when states do not have consistent
policies (though the issue is analogous when countries lack
consistent policies as well). The problem is one of “leakage,” and the
problems internationally and domestically are analogous. 436
Internationally, the leakage phenomenon occurs when Country A
limits greenhouse gas emissions, resulting in the offending
producers of greenhouse gases moving or “leaking” into unregulated
(or less regulated) Country B.437 The result potentially is the
weakening of environmental legislation. Not only is the global
effectiveness of Country A’s regulations undercut, but Country A
will be put at a competitive disadvantage as well. 438 And just as
leakage creates problems between Countries A and B, leakage can
create analogous problems when adjacent states have differing
levels of environmental regulation in place.
Other issues confront the states as well. For example, a
potential practical constraint on states could be their limited
technical capacity for dealing with the enormous complexity of
climate change.439 Many have argued that the federal level might
be the most efficient venue for scientific inquiry into environmental
concerns, because national agencies could take advantage of scale
economies in research and could act as central clearing houses for
information.440
On the other side, state regulation may provide opportunities
which the federal government lacks. For example, in the realm of
adaptation–that is, efforts designed to deal with the consequences
of global warming instead of the cause – the use of forestry and
vegetation to combat greenhouse gases seems to readily fall within
the realm of state regulations, as they require land use controls, an
area regularly regulated by the states.

C. Non-Federal Responses to Climate Change
In light of these concerns, non-federal actors have responded in
a myriad of ways, ranging from coalitions to action by the states to
municipal responses to business-lead initiatives.441 A brief overview
of some prominent responses suggest the seriousness with which
the issue is being addressed.
436. Carol McAusland & Naouri Najjar, The WTO Consistency of Carbon
Footprint Taxes, 46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 765, 767 (2015).
437. Id.
438. Id. at 800.
439. Brad Plumer, How Can U.S. States Fight Climate Change if Trump
Quits the Paris Accord?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2017), www.nytimes.com/
2017/09/20/climate/paris-climate-accord-trump.html.
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To begin with, a number of coalitions have emerged. For
example, America’s Pledge, launched by Michael Bloomberg and
Jerry Brown, is designed to aggregate and quantify the activity of
states, cities, and businesses toward limiting greenhouse gas
emissions consistent with the Paris Agreement.442 The Pledge aims
to “[c]ollect data on non-national climate action to quantify and
report on progress made towards the US pledge (Nationally
Determined Contribution) under the Paris Agreement[,]
[c]ommunicate the findings and results of [their] research and data
collected from non-national actors to the international community
and the United Nations,” and “[c]atalyze further climate action in
the near term by providing detailed roadmaps for similar businesslevel, city, and state action in the US and, potentially, in other
countries around the world.”443
At the 2017 Bonn Conference on Climate Change, 20 U.S.
states, more than 50 major American cities, and more than 60 of the
country’s largest businesses pledged to meet emission reduction
goals.444 Added together, the economic power of these entities would
be the third biggest economy in the world, trailing only the U.S. and
China.445 The commitment, however, is unlikely to satisfy the
pledges necessary to achieve the American obligations under the
Paris Agreement.446
A similar approach has been developed by the We Are Still In
Coalition.447 The Coalition, formed in direct response to President
442. About America’s Pledge, AMERICA’S PLEDGE, www.americaspledge
onclimate.com/about/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2019).
443. Id.
444. Fiona Harvey & Jonathan Watts, US Groups Honouring Paris Climate
Pledges
Despite
Trump,
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
11,
2017),
www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/nov/11/us-groups-honouring-parisclimate-pledges-despite-trump. These numbers have since grown, and as of this
writing, the numbers are at least 10 states, 248 cities, and 2162 businesses.
Who’s In, WE ARE STILL IN, www.wearestillin.com/signatories (last visited Mar.
22, 2019). Twenty-four companies headquartered in the U.S. have set sciencebased targets on their emissions. 100+ Global Corporations Commit to ScienceBased Targets Aligned with Paris, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE (Apr. 17,
2018), unfccc.int/news/100-global-corporations-commit-to-science-based-targets
-aligned-with-paris-agreement; see State and Local Climate, CTR. FOR CLIMATE
STRATEGIES, www.climatestrategies.us/policy_tracker/state (last visited March
22, 2019) (indicating climate action activities at a number of governmental
levels); see U.S. State Climate Action Plans, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY
SOLUTIONS
(Dec.
2018),
www.c2es.org/document/climate-action-plans/
(describing state climate action plans).
445. Harvey & Watts, supra note 444.
446. Brad Plumer & Nadja Popovich, Here’s How Far the World is From
Meeting Its Climate Goals, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017), www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2017/11/06/climate/world-emissions-goals-far-off-course.html;
see
also Matt McGrath, Small Steps Forward as UN Climate Talks End in Bonn,
BBC NEWS (Nov. 18, 2017), www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-42032229
(noting that the COP23 meeting did not address the Parties’ inability to lower
emissions in order to meet the Paris target).
447. See generally WE ARE STILL IN, www.wearestillin.com/ (last visited
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Trump withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, is comprised of
cities, states, businesses, and other organizations who remain
committed to complying with the Paris Agreement and to helping
America reach its Paris targets.448 The main function of the
coalition is to connect all the individuals, companies, and
organizations who are committed to climate action and help pool all
the resources and actions to share knowledge to achieve the
common goal.449 As of this writing, signatories include 2,162
businesses and investors, 282 cities and counties, 348 colleges and
universities, 55 cultural institutions, 28 health care organizations,
43 faith groups, 10 states, and 9 tribes. 450
Significant state action pre-dates America’s withdrawal from
the Paris Agreement. By 2006, every state had taken steps of some
kind to address climate change.451 Currently, 33 states have
implemented comprehensive plans devoted to climate change. 452 It
is estimated that the benefits of these measures will result in a 17%
decrease in emissions by 2025 as compared to 2005 levels.453
California has been particularly proactive. In addition to
enacting legislation aimed at reducing greenhouse emissions from
automobiles and electrical generators, with an eye on Paris
Agreement targets, California recently extended a program first
enacted in 2006 until 2030 which established a cap-and-trade
emissions system.454 The goal is to achieve a 40% cut in climatewarming emissions by 2030, when compared to 1990 levels. 455 The
Mar. 22, 2019) (explaining the We Are Still In initiative and identifying active
participants).
448. Id.
449. Zeke Hausfather, Analysis: US States and Cities Could Meet Paris
Climate Goals Without Trump, CARBON BRIEF (June 15, 2017),
www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-us-states-cities-could-meet-paris-climate-goalswithout-trump.
450. Who’s In, supra note 444.
451. Christopher Mahoney, The Geopolitical Implications of the United
States of America’s Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, 2 CARDOZO J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 282, 303 (2018).
452. State and Local Climate, supra note 444; U.S. State Climate Action
Plans, supra note 444.
453. Tom Cyrs et al., U.S. States, Cities and Businesses Are Cutting
Emissions, and Poised to Do Even More. New Report Does the Math, WORLD
RES. INST. (Sept. 12, 2018), www.wri.org/blog/2018/09/us-states-cities-andbusinesses-are-cutting-emissions-and-poised-do-even-more. The U.S. pledge is
to reduce emissions by 26 to 28 percent. Id. 2015 emissions were reduced by
11.5% of 2005 levels; projected to be reduced by 14.1% to 17.8% without the
extra efforts. Doug Vine, Projecting and Accelerating U.S. Greenhouse Gas
Reductions, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS (Sept. 2017),
www.c2es.org/site/assets/uploads/2017/09/projecting-accelerating-usgreenhouse-gas-reductions.pdf.
454. Oliver Milman, California Lawmakers Extend Program to Cut
Emissions
in
Bipartisan
Vote,
GUARDIAN
(July
18,
2017),
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jul/18/california-extend-carbonemissions-climate-change-program.
455. Cal. Exec. Order No. B-55-18 (2018). A notable change in policy. For
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program requires emitters to either reduce emissions or purchase
permits allowing emissions from those who have. 456 With
approximately 39 million people and the world’s sixth largest
economy, and with an economic output of $2.4 trillion, these
programs can make a profound difference.457
In addition, California has a “decarbonization” program that
creates numerous jobs and helps the State move away from the use
of fossil fuels.458 It also recently approved a requirement that nearly
all new homes be equipped with solar panels by 2020. 459 California
also plans to adhere to the Obama-era requirement that the average
mileage for a truck or car be 54.5 miles per gallon by 2025.460
Washington Governor Jay Inslee has been trying to institute
the country’s first tax on carbon dioxide pollution for a number of
years.461 Opponents’ concerns center on the issue of whether the tax
would increase the price of both gasoline and electricity.462
In Colorado, then-Governor John Hickenlooper (a former
candidate for President in 2020)463 issued an executive order on July
11, 2017 regarding Colorado’s plan to use cleaner energy
resources.464 The following goals were laid out: first, to reduce
example, between 1990 and 2001, California emissions, the second largest in
the country, increased by 85%. Daniel A. Farber, The Case for Climate
Compensation: Justice for Climate Change Victims in a Complex World, 2008
UTAH L. REV. 377, 385 (2008). The state with the largest percentage of
emissions, Texas, increased its emissions by 178%. Id.
456. O. Nilay Manzogol, California Plans to Reduce Greenhouse Gas
Emissions 40% by 2030, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 2, 2018),
www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=34792.
457. Coral Davenport & Adam Nagourney, Fighting Trump on Climate,
California Becomes a Global Force, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2017), www.ny
times.com/2017/05/23/us/california-engages-world-and-fights-washington-onclimate-change.html.
458. Justin Gerdes, California Regulators Get Serious About Building
Decarbonization, GREENTECH MEDIA (Feb. 15, 2019), www.greentech
media.com/articles/read/california-regulators-get-serious-about-buildingdecarbonization; see also Ralph Cavanagh, Historic California Climate
Protection Bill Advances, NRDC (July 3, 2018), www.nrdc.org/experts/ralphcavanagh/historic-california-climate-protection-bill-advances
(describing
California climate bill and projected benefits).
459. Froma Harrop, Harrop: California Leads Way on Environment in
Trump's Absence, HERALDNET (May 15, 2018), www.heraldnet.com/
opinion/harrop-california-leads-way-on-environment-in-trumps-absence/.
460. Id.
461. Coral Davenport, In a Gamble to Make Climate Change a Political Win,
a Governor Pursues a Carbon Tax, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2018),
www.nytimes.com/2018/03/01/climate/jay-inslee-carbon-tax.html.
462. Id. Carbon tax bills have also been introduced in the legislatures of
Utah, Maryland, New York, Hawaii, Rhode Island, Vermont, Maine and
Washington, D.C. Id.
463. Matt Stevens & Matt Flegenheimer, John Hickenlooper, Ending
Presidential Bid, Will Give Senate ‘Serious Thought’, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2019)
www.nytimes.com/2019/08/15/us/politics/john-hickenlooper-drop-outsenate.html.
464. Colo., Exec. Order No. D 2017-15, at 2 (2017).
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greenhouse gas emissions by more than 26% of 2005 levels by 2025;
second, to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from electricity by 25%
of 2012 levels by 2025 and 35% by 2030; and third, by 2020 to have
saved 2% of total electricity sales by utilizing cost-effective
electricity.465 In order to achieve those goals, Colorado agencies will
team up with electric utilities or cooperatives and increase their use
of renewable energy, as long as it does not increase the cost of
electricity to consumers or cause service to be unreliable. 466 The
Colorado Energy Office, the Regional Air Quality Council, and the
Colorado Department of Public Health and the Environment are
charged with developing the plan to reduce air pollution. 467 The
Colorado Department of Public Health and the Environment is also
charged with developing an approach to addressing state
greenhouse gas emissions.468
New Jersey passed two bills on April 12, 2018, each requiring
power companies to generate 50 percent of their electricity from
renewable sources and to subsidize existing nuclear power plants
by 2030.469 Assembly Bill 3723, introduced on March 22, 2018, lays
out New Jersey’s clean energy and energy efficiency programs and
modifies the solar renewable energy portfolio standards. 470 Forty
percent of New Jersey’s electricity comes from nuclear energy and
an annual subsidy of $300 million for existing nuclear plants was
announced with the bills.471 Although nuclear energy is not favored
by some because of safety and disposal concerns, it is considered a
clean energy because it emits no greenhouse gases. 472 Nuclear
energy, although not without faults, is a stepping stone to continue
the transition away from fossil fuels to cleaner energy.
As for cities, the Climate Mayors Initiative is a group of 407
mayors who have agreed to adhere to the Paris Agreement by
adopting and intensifying existing efforts to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions and switch to clean energy.473 It was founded in 2014, and
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Id.
469. A.B. No. 3723, 218th Leg. (N.J. 2018) (enacted).
470. Id.
471. Nick Corasaniti, New Jersey Takes a Big Step Toward Renewable
Energy (and Nuclear Gets Help, for Now), N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2018),
www.nytimes.com/2018/04/12/nyregion/new-jersey-renewable-energy.html.
472. Id.
473. 407 US Climate Mayors Commit to Adopt, Honor and Uphold Paris
Climate
Agreement
Goals,
CLIMATE MAYORS
(June
1,
2018),
climatemayors.org/actions/paris-climate-agreement/. This response has been
global. By June of 2017, mayors of more than 7,400 cities across the globe had
vowed to combat President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Paris
Agreement. Daniel Boffey, Mayors of 7,400 Cities Vow to Meet Obama’s Climate
Commitments, GUARDIAN (June 28, 2017), www.theguardian.com/
environment/2017/jun/28/global-covenant-mayors-cities-vow-to-meet-obamaclimate-commitments.
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it has gained even more traction in light of the withdrawal of the
United States from the Paris Agreement by President Trump. 474
Like the We Are Still In Coalition, the Climate Mayors Initiative
serves as a platform and network for mayors who want to share
resources and other advances they are making related to climate
change.
At the conclusion of the December 2017 North American
Climate Summit, 57 mayors signed the Chicago Climate Charter,
representing their commitment to the Paris Agreement. 475 The
main commitments include the following: first, to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions to a level consistent with the Paris
Agreement; second, to measure, track, and report emissions; third,
to request more authority for cities to create laws and policies;
fourth, to ensure diversity in opinions and ideas when establishing
goals, policies, procedures; fifth, to develop plans that address
adaptation and remediation, not just reduction; sixth, to work on a
city, state, and federal level to incentivize all actors; and seventh, to
consult with experts and others who can help foster solutions. 476
And, of course, numerous individual cities have acted on
climate change. Los Angeles has launched the Sustainable City
pLAn, providing, among other things, for the launching of a green
technology incubator, for building public transit, for adding
charging stations for electric vehicles, and for reducing carbon
dioxide emissions at the port of Los Angeles. 477 San Francisco has
announced the goal of being a net-zero greenhouse gas emissions
city by 2050.478 Chicago has vowed to reduce GHG emissions by 25%
of 1990 levels by 2020 and by 80% by 2050 and to complete an
energy efficiency retrofit in 23,000 homes and 132 buildings
spanning over 70 million square feet, saving nearly $17 million/year
and over 91,000 metric tons of avoided GHG emissions. 479 It has also
proposed a policy known as “Building on Burnham,” which is a
comprehensive strategy to invest in Chicago’s lakefront, natural
areas, and recreational areas across the city. 480 Salt Lake City
officials have established goals of “relying on renewable energy for
474. CLIMATE MAYORS, climatemayors.org/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2019).
475. CHICAGO CLIMATE CHARTER, www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/
mayor/Press%20Room/Press%20Releases/2017/December/ChicagoClimate
Charter.pdf (last visited April 30, 2019).
476. Id.
477. Daniel C. Vock, Mayors Vow Not to Let Feds Trump Their Climate
Change Fight, GOVERNING (Dec. 19, 2016), www.governing.com/topics/
transportation-infrastructure/gov-climate-change-trump-mayors.html.
478. Office of the Mayor, Mayor Mark Farrell Announces Historic
Commitment to Net-Zero Emissions by 2050, CITY AND CTY. OF S.F. (Apr. 19,
2018), sfmayor.org/article/mayor-mark-farrell-announces-historic-commitment
-net-zero-emissions-2050.
479. CLIMATE MAYORS, CITIES CLIMATE ACTION COMPENDIUM,
climatemayors.org/actions/climate-action-compendium/ (last updated Jan. 5,
2018).
480. Id.
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50% of municipal operations by 2020 and [of] generating 100% of
the community’s electric supply through renewable energy by
2032.”481 “Washington, D.C. has set a goal of using renewables to
meet 50% of its energy supply by 2032.” 482 And there are many more
such efforts.
As for businesses, it is clear that successfully combatting
climate change will have to result from a public-private
partnership. The financial strength of many multi-national
corporations necessitates their involvement, and numerous
corporations have stepped up with plans to address these issues. To
date, over two thirds of publicly traded companies have pledges to
reduce GHG emissions, and 36% of those companies have set
deadlines to do so.483 Approximately one third of these businesses
have made commitments to transition to renewable energy.484 A few
examples suffice. General Mills has reported a goal of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions 28% by 2025 and to eventually be in line
with the Paris Agreement by 2050. 485 One hundred percent of
Apple’s facilities are powered with clean energy, including retail
stores, offices, data centers, and co-located facilities.486 Moreover, 23
of its suppliers have also committed to use 100% clean energy.487
Apple has 25 global renewable energy projects with 626 megawatts
of generation capacity and 286 megawatts of solar photovoltaic
generation.488 Since 2011, Apple’s projects have reduced greenhouse
gas emissions by 54% and prevented 2.1 million metric tons of
carbon dioxide equivalent.489 Walmart has launched Project
Gigaton to eliminate one gigaton of greenhouse gases from 2015 to
2030.490 Project Gigaton focuses on six areas: energy, agriculture,
deforestation, packaging, waste, and product use. 491 Walmart has
481. Aamer Madhani, Forget Paris: U.S. Mayors Sign Their Own Pact After
Trump Ditches Climate Accord, USA TODAY (Dec. 4, 2017), www.usatoday.com/
story/news/2017/12/04/u-s-mayors-sign-pact-track-progress-parisagreement/920305001/.
482. Id.
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Climate Goals?, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Apr. 24, 2018), insideclimatenews.org/
news/24042018/american-companies-leaders-greenhouse-gas-targetsrenewable-energy-ceres-study.
484. Id.
485. Id.
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Energy (Apr. 9, 2018), www.apple.com/newsroom/2018/04/apple-now-globallypowered-by-100-percent-renewable-energy/.
487. Id.
488. Id. Solar photovoltaic generation is essentially turning light into
electricity through the use of solar panels.
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wire.com/news/home/20180418005917/en/.
491. Walmart Makes Bold Climate Commitments and Delivers, WE ARE
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become one of the country’s leading commercial solar and on-site
renewable energy users, obtaining approximately a quarter of its
global energy from renewable sources. 492 In 2017, Google purchased
energy from renewable resources sufficient to power 100% of its
energy consumption.493

D. Conclusion
If climate change is going to be successfully addressed in a
meaningful fashion and the targets of the Paris Agreement are to
be met, it is clear that all levels of government must exercise their
powers, whether exclusive or concurrent, and all varieties of
businesses must contribute to the cause. The division of authority
among overlapping competencies can work to aid, rather than
detract from, the achievement of the goal as each actor can address
those aspects of the problem it is best situated to address.
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